THE INTERPRETATION OF THE FIRST VERSE [KETUHANAN YANG MAHA ESA] OF PANCASILA

Syaiful Hakam

Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia
hakam9@gmail.com

Abstract: Historically, in Indonesia, there are two interpretations of the first verse of Pancasila. The first is [Pengakuan adanya Tuhan] Recognition of the Divine Omnipotence. This translation is used to use by secular group including communist and non-Muslim group especially Buddhist and Hindus. This interpretation was dominant in 1945-1965 when Sukarno as the creator of Pancasila still dominated the political power. Or, this verse was dominant when the secular-nationalist group still had strong position in Indonesia. The fact of it is during the time there was no a policy about official religions from state and the requirement of religious teaching in schools and universities. And, it must be noted that Sukarno as the creator of Pancasila in Guided Democracy era, strongly interpreted Pancasila in his speech and address as the Nasakom that is National, Religion, and Communist. Sukarno as the creator of Pancasila strongly insisted that he was truly nationalist and in his heart he was a truly Muslim. So, it can be said the Recognition of the Divine Omnipotence is the original interpretation of the first verse of Pancasila. My argumentation is originally in the early beginning of the Republic the meaning of religion was religion as a faith not as an institution.

Keywords: pancasila, first verse, sukarno

A. Preface

In this paper I examine the rise of the first verse of Pancasila, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa to find out the relation between state and religion in Indonesia in order to understand the meaning of religion Indonesia. I focus on one critical moment in history that is the early years leading until to independence (1945), with their hot debates over the ideological foundations...
of the Indonesian state. This period was vital in the making of modern Indonesia. The debates in this period contain the different understanding between of religion between of secular group and religious group. The main problem in this paper is why religion is so important? Why Indonesian is too much religion?

In my opinion, to understand about the meaning of religion in Indonesia, it is important to understand the deep conflict between secular-nationalist group including communist group and religious group especially Muslim in Indonesia. The secular-nationalist group wanted to religion became a private concern. They wanted to religion as a faith not as an institution. While the religious group wanted to religion not only as a faith but they also wanted to religion as an institution by proposing Islam as a basis of the new Republic of Indonesia. It is means they wanted Indonesia as an Islamic state.

Actually, long before the preparation of the independence of Indonesia or in the National movement era in 1920s-1930s, there had been the profound debate about the relation between religion, especially Islam, and state. The Muslim groups such as Sarekat Islam, Muhammadijah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Persis had a dream or a notion to build an Islamic state in Indonesia. Wilfred Cantwell Smith argued that the group in Islamic world who insist to build Islamic state was a group who regard Islam not only as a merely religion but also as a nizam. It is similar with Western concept of religion as an institution. (Smith, 1991, 115-118)

While, the secular-nationalist especially Soekarno with his Partai Nasional Indonesia refused the idea of the Islamic State. He was really influenced by the secular nationalist reformers in Turkey to build the national state.

B. Religion and Nation-State

In the first decades of the twentieth century, the idea of nation was the focus of debated in the Muslim countries (Hefner, 2000, 38). Several Muslims intellectuals refused to the idea. They opined that the principle of popular sovereignty is not appropriate with principles of divine law. For example, Muhammad Iqbal, a Pakistan philosopher, insisted that Islam demands a borderless community. He argued that European colonialism had destroyed the unity of the Islam world (Hefner, 2000, 38). However, Iqbal was eventually aware to the fact that the reconstitution of a universal Muslim polity is impossible. In reality, each Muslim territory struggled for its own independence (Hefner, 2000, 38). It is true that a few nonconformists criticize a principle state that elevates human will above the divine. But, the tendency in the twentieth century is Muslims accepted the legitimacy of the nation-state. They have to put their politics within its horizons.
Today, most Muslims accept the legitimacy of the nation-state. But, it does not mean that they agree on the terms of its organization. It does also not indicate that they support the secular ideology. Nationalism is not sewn of one cloth. Some Western theories imply that religious ideals have played an important role in nationalisms in twentieth century (Anderson, 1991, 7). Actually, the movement of religious ideals into the nationalist idea has been more deeply debated in the Muslim countries. For more than a century Muslims have struggled with the question of how to accommodate Muslim politics to nationhood and citizenship. In the late twentieth century the struggle between secular or non confessional nationalism and Islamic nationalism has given the argument new vigor.

In Indonesia the question of the role religion should play in the idea and practice of the nation is an important point in 1920s. The first modern mass organization of native people Indonesia is the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union). It was established in 1912. It quickly achieved success in very important regions of the archipelago (Kahin, 1952, 65) However, the organization eventually failed because a question about Islam’s role in an independent state. Established to defend the interest of Muslim merchants against Chinese merchants, Sarekat Islam (SI) at first depended heavily on Islamic appeals. However, the organization was torn by ideological strife between members committed to the conventional Muslim politics and those inclined toward Marxism and secular nationalism. In 1921 the rivalry between the two factions came to a head with the expulsion of left-wing members from the organization (Shiraishi, 1990). Over the next five years leftists (known as red SI) and Muslim (known as white) vied for control of SI’s local chapters. Coinciding as it did with the growing the Dutch colonial state repression, the rivalry shattered the fledging organization. It left the native struggle for independence in disarray.

With Sarekat Islam’s demise, leadership of the nationalist struggle passed into the hands of nonreligious nationalists. The most important nationalist organization was the Indonesian Nationalist Party. Established in 1927 under the leadership of a Dutch-educated engineer, Sukarno, the PNI was based on multiethnic nationalism (kebangsaan), nor religion or ethno-nationalism. Although raised as a Muslim, Sukarno received his advanced education in the plural environment of colonial schools. According to Benedict Anderson in his book about Nationalism, Sukarno was the sort of carbide olé functionary (Anderson, 1991, 105). Sukarno was identified as the prototypical carrier of the secular nationalist idea. Trained at a time when the Dutch colonial state required many administrators, Sukarno was attracted to the ideas of European Enlightenment and socialist liberalism. Like many other native
Indonesians, this experience led Sukarno to embrace a concept of nation that transcended ethnicity, region, and religion.

Sukarno’s non-confessional conviction was caused his belief that historical Islam had diverged from Islam’s original ideals and only exacerbated the dilemma of Muslim countries to the West. Influenced by secular nationalist reformers in Turkey and the Middle East, the young Sukarno argued that the union of religion and state in traditional Muslim governance had caused to the Muslim world’s stagnation (Sukarno, 1964, 404-7). Sukarno argued that the separation religion from state would liberate Islam from the tendencies of corrupt rulers and unleash its progressive potentialities. In making this argument, the young Sukarno took pains to point out that he was not a secularist opposed to Islamic values. On the contrary, he argued that religious disestablishment would facilitate their more effective realization in society.

According to Islamic politicians at the time, Sukarno’s nationalist notions seemed a basis to build a new political order. While a small group of the native people had the privilege of Western education, many of them made a different social pilgrimage through a network of mosque and Islamic schools. These Muslim groups even reached across archipelago to Arabia. The Middle Eastern reformist ideas spread through this network in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This condition demonstrates that Islamic education was not only a localized institution. A channel for Islamic reformism in the nineteenth century and in the twentieth this network transmitted ideas of Islamic nationalism (Anderson, 1991, 111).

The movements of this Muslim nationalism were convinced that Islam was the proper ground to build the nation. For these Muslim groups, Sukarno’s nationalism was too Western creation. This fact was easily apparent in the educational background of most of the secular leaders which graduated from European schools. For these Muslims groups, secular nationalism looked like a modern version of the ethnic solidarities which had divided the Arabs pre Islamic times and against which Prophet Muhammad had struggle (Hefner, 2000, 39). In addition, Muslim leaders said, Islam is not only a matter of individual piety and private belief, like modern Christianity. Islam is a civilization and social order. Islam is a complete and self-sufficient system. Its components cannot be artificially separated from one another. They refuse Western liberal ideas to separating religion and state. This image of Islam as an eternal and complete social order is a recurrent theme in modern Islamist politics. And, it still divides Indonesian Muslim to this day (Anwar, 1995).

Influenced by the writings of Middle Eastern reformist like Muhammad Abduh and Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afgani, reformist Muslims in Indonesia were keen to formulate a systematic response to the challenge of the West. In Indonesia several reformist organizations
arose in the early twentieth century to take up this charge. The most influential of these was Muhammadiyah. Founded in 1912 in Central Java by a minor religious official in the Javanese courts, the Muhammadiyah focused its attention on education, health, and care for the poor (Alfian, 1983). In last years of the colonial era, the Muhammadiyah spread to most corners of archipelago. The Muhammadiyah showed none of traditionalist Islam’s reverse toward Western education, technology, and science; it was unabashedly modernist. Organizationally too, the Muhammadiyah repudiated the traditionalists emphasis on charismatic religious leadership and developed organizations with the rule-governed bureaucracies and open elections.

However, bold their innovations in education and association, the modernist were timid on the question of the state. Some insisted that the Quran and Sunna (the recorded example of the Prophet Muhammad) provided no comprehensive blueprint for political organization or Islamic state. For these thinkers, what Islam offers is generalized principles of equality, mutual consultation, and social justice, values compatible with modern democracy. But, other Muslim reformists insisted that the normative precedents for an Islamic politics are more systematic than general principles alone. An Islamic politics must affirm the details and not only the spirit of shariah (divine law) and seek its full implementation in the state and society. (Hefner, 2000, 40)

In the late Dutch colonial period, Muslim political groups were aware that they could not reach a consensus on the matters. The collapse of Sarekat Islam provided a painful image of their schism. Muslim modernist writers responded to this problem by refusing any reexamination of Muslim political theory. They focused on general issues of native rights, education and welfare. A more definitive formulation of state principles and organization would have to await some future moment. To force consensus too quickly would only weaken Muslim community. However, viewing from the perspective of Muslim solidarity, this strategy meant that most Muslims intellectuals continued to look away from their own history as a source of empirical insight into what is needed to create a modern and democratic Muslim politics.

Faced to this challenge of political renewal, other Indonesians found themselves drawn to the ideas of a secular and nonreligious nationalism. Even many pious Muslims argued that a compromise of this sort was important if the independence movement was not caused Muslims against secular nationalist and non-Muslim minorities. Although the 1930s non-Muslim compromised 7 or 8 percent of the Dutch Indies population, most of them were concentrated in cohesive territories, in the islands of eastern Indonesia and inland portions of
Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. In the late colonial period the state’s administrative infrastructure in these regions was still weak. And a well-organized secessionist movement might well presented a serious challenge to the fledgling republic.

C. The Short History of Pancasila

During the first months of 1942 Japanese armies attacked the East Indies. They ended the Dutch Colonialism. The Japanese occupation made a new era for Indonesian politics and religion. The Japanese regime recognized the strong ties of Muslim leaders to the native people. The Japanese showed none of hesitation to Muslim. They established a Department of Religious Affairs, largely for Muslim concerns. They supported the creation of a unified Muslim political federation, known as Masyumi. They also trained Muslim militias. However, the Japanese were also aware of the depth of religious division in the native community. They balanced their courtship of Muslim with the initiatives for non-Muslims and secular nationalists. In fact, the Japanese gave secular nationalists a larger role in the government. They also gave them the most of leadership positions in the auxiliary army established in October 1943. In the last months of the occupation, the balance of power the Japanese had maintained between religion and secular nationalists collapsed into open rivalry (Benda, 1983, 42-47).

With an allied invasion imminent, the Japanese, on March 1, 1945, allowed the native community to form an Investigate Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan). In the politic structure of an independence Indonesia, the committee reached agreement on basic economy and constitutional issues. But the committee deadlocked on the important issues of religion role in the state. On June 1, 1945, Sukarno attempted to resolve the crisis by proposing the five principles that is Pancasila. He offered Pancasila as the philosophical foundation for an independent Indonesia (Kahin, 1952, 123) (Feillard, 1998). Sukarno’s Pancasila was unique synthesis of nationalist, Muslim, Marxist, liberal democratic and populist-Indonesian ideas. The Javanese leader hoped the doctrine’s woolly eclecticism would satisfy both secular and Islamic nationalist.

But, Muslim leaders regarded the Pancasila’s pronouncements on religion as unclear doctrine at the best and anti-Islamist at worst. The first principle declared that the Indonesian nation was founded on “belief in God.” This principle was unspecific. This principle left wiggle room for heretical mystics, apostates, ethnic, religionist, Communists. Muslim leaders felt undeserving of recognition. There was also no mention of state support for Islam. Faced
with Muslim objections, a committee revised and expanded the first principle from simple belief of God to “belief in God with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law [shariah].

Now it was the turn of secularists and non-Muslims to protest. They objected that the revised formulation left vague just who was to enforce Islamic law. There was also mention of what penalties might be imposed for Muslims who refused to abide by the term of the law. However, Muslim leaders held their argument. They insisted that the clause had to stay in the statement of national principles. Eventually known as the Jakarta Charter,” this principle of state support Islamic law was to be a bone of contention for years to come (Boland, 1982).

In August 18, just one day after the Independence declaration of independence, Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta yielded to the appeals of Christian, Hindus, and non-religious nationalist and dropped the Jakarta Charter from the preamble to the Indonesian Constitution. At the recommendation of Muslim leaders in Nahdlatul Ulama, Sukarno added a clause to the first principle of Pancasila so that it read not just as belief in God but belief in singular God. The concession brought the first principle closer to the central Muslim tauhid, the affirmation of God’s invisible oneness. This was to prove a significant amendment. In years to come, this revised phrasing would legitimate state efforts to proscribe animism and polytheism as acceptable options for citizens. However, for those who had hoped for a formal linkage Islam and state, this new phrasing was still a poor substitute for the Jakarta Charter. Coming as it did in the aftermath of weeks of negotiations, many Muslim leaders felt betrayed.

D. Conclusion

Historically, In Indonesia, there are two interpretation of the first verse of Pancasila. The first is [Pengakuan adanya Tuhan] Recognition of the Divine Omnipotence. This translation is used to use by secular group including communist and non-Muslim group especially Buddhist and Hindus. This interpretation was dominant in 1945-1965 when Sukarno as the creator of Pancasila still dominated the political power. Or, this verse was dominant when the secular-nationalist group still had strong position in Indonesia. The fact of it is during the time there was no a policy about official religions from state and the requirement of religious teaching in schools and universities. And, it must be noted that Sukarno as the creator of Pancasila in Guided Democracy era, strongly interpreted Pancasila in his speech and address as the Nasakom that is National, Religion, and Communist. Sukarno as the creator of Pancasila strongly insisted that I was truly nationalist and in my heart I was a truly Muslim. So, it can be said the Recognition of the Divine Omnipotence is the original
interpretation of the first verse of Pancasila. My argumentation is originally in the early beginning of the Republic the meaning of religion was religion as a faith not as an institution.

I think the meaning of the first verse of Pancasila from Sukarno is similar with Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s idea about faith. Smith in his book The Meaning and End of Religion page 171 argued that Faith can be expressed—more historically: faith has been expressed, observably—in words, both prose and poetry; in patterns of deeds, both ritual and morality; in art, in institution, in law, in community, in character, and in still many other ways (Smith, 1991, 117).

The second is [Percaya Pada Tuhan Yang Esa] The Belief in One God. I argued that this interpretation strongly emerged in the early time of New Order regime. Actually, this translation is coming form Muslim group. They translate this verse as Tauhid, believing to One God, the central doctrine of Muslim. The Muslim faction in Parlement, The Nahdlatul Ulama Party, in 1966 was successful implement this interpretation in the religious law (Feillard, 1999,121-126). These are the requirement for all citizens to profess a religion, the requirement of religious teaching in schools and universities and then the policy of official religions in Indonesia. The new order regime supported the law because the law was important as a political policy to banned Communist Party. Actually, this interpretation had serious implication for non-Muslims. According to Sita Hidayah (Hidayah, 2008, 41-45) in her thesis in CRCS, Religion in the Proper Sense of the Word: the Discourse of Agama in Indonesia, this interpretation had serious impacts on citizenship.

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