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## **Political Broker Giving Money and Intimidating in Regional Head Elections in Indonesia**

**Mohammad Hidayaturrahman**

Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Wiraraja, Madura

[hidayaturrahman@wiraraja.ac.id](mailto:hidayaturrahman@wiraraja.ac.id)

**Sudarman**

Faculty of Adab and Humaniora, Universitas Islam Negeri Imam Bonjol

[sudarmanma@uinib.ac.id](mailto:sudarmanma@uinib.ac.id)

**Naili Adilah Hamhij**

Faculty of Teaching and Education, Universitas Islam Negeri Raden Intan Lampung

[nayhamhij@gmail.com](mailto:nayhamhij@gmail.com)

**Anak Agung Putu Sugiantiningsih**

STISPOL Wira Bhakti, Bali

[gektien@gmail.com](mailto:gektien@gmail.com)

**Ahmad Hasan Ubaid**

Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Brawijaya, Malang

[hasanubaid82@ub.ac.id](mailto:hasanubaid82@ub.ac.id)

**Elazhari**

Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Pembinaan Masyarakat Indonesia

[elazhari12345@gmail.com](mailto:elazhari12345@gmail.com)

### **Abstract**

The election of regional heads is actually a place to make choices directly by the people or voters in the regions. But in fact, the choice of voters is much influenced, even manipulated by political brokers. This study was conducted to reveal the models of political brokers and their operating patterns in regional head elections in Indonesia. Political brokers have hijacked direct democracy in local elections. The regional head should have a direct contract with the voters, related to the work program at the time of contestation and accountability at the time of election. But the process was hijacked midway by political brokers. Political brokers have long operated in the process in Indonesia, both general elections, presidential elections, village head elections, and regional head elections. This research used descriptive qualitative method. Data was collected through in-depth interviews with informants who were directly involved in the regional head election. From the research conducted, it is found that political brokers in

regional head elections in Indonesia are village heads, and community leaders. Political brokers perform their role in two ways. First, by giving money to the head of the electorate. The money comes from regional head candidates who are given by the winning team for regional head candidates for political brokers. The money given by regional head candidates to political brokers consists of money for own political broker and operational money, as well as money to be distributed to voters. Second, political brokers also act to intimidate, threaten and frighten potential voters, if they do not vote for candidates who are supported by political brokers.

Keywords: Political Brokers, Regional Head Elections, Vote Buying, Money Politics

### **Abstrak**

Pemilihan kepala daerah sejatinya merupakan ajang untuk menentukan pilihan secara langsung oleh rakyat atau pemilih di daerah. Namun kenyataannya, pilihan para pemilih banyak dipengaruhi, bahkan dimanipulasi oleh broker politik. Broker politik telah membajak demokrasi langsung pada pemilihan daerah. Seharusnya kepala daerah melakukan kontrak langsung dengan para pemilihnya, berkaitan dengan program kerja pada saat kontestasi maupun pertanggungjawaban pada saat terpilih. Namun proses tersebut dibajak di tengah jalan oleh broker politik. Broker politik telah lama beroperasi pada proses di Indonesia, baik pemilihan umum, pemilihan presiden, pemilihan kepala desa, dan pemilihan kepala daerah. Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk mengungkap model broker politik dan pola operasi mereka pada pemilihan kepala daerah di Indonesia. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif deskriptif. Pengumpulan data dilakukan dengan wawancara mendalam bersama para informan yang terlibat langsung dalam pemilihan kepala daerah, seperti orang dekat calon kepala daerah, tim pemenangan pasangan calon kepala daerah, anggota komisioner pemilihan umum daerah, dan broker politik. Selain itu dilakukan juga penelusuran dokumen terhadap berbagai sumber, baik jurnal maupun media online yang menulis mengenai pemilihan kepala daerah. Dari penelitian yang dilakukan, ditemukan broker politik pada pemilihan kepala daerah di Indonesia adalah kepala desa, dan tokoh organisasi masyarakat. Pola operasi broker politik beragam, ada yang menerima uang untuk biaya operasional mencari suara dan uang saku pengganti uang lelah bekerja mengumpulkan suara untuk calon kepala daerah. Selain itu, ada pula yang menerima uang untuk dibagikan kepada pemilih sebagai vote buying.

Kata kunci: Broker Politik, Pemilihan Kepala Daerah, Jual Beli Suara, Politik Uang.

### **INTRODUCTION**

Brokers have become a phenomenon that has been known as a global conversation and issue. At first, the broker operated in business or business activities and was self-employed (Christopoulos & Ingold, 2011). A broker was in the activity of being a facilitator of immigrants crossing various countries. From these activities, brokers gained economic and business benefits (Lindquist et al., 2012). Then, brokers also entered the public sector (White & Christopoulos, 2011). Government policy and decisions making for various interests were also not spared by brokers. Brokers are in the decision-making space and lobbying that are planned, created and implemented by governments (Christopoulos; Ingold, 2015). The brokerage operations are increasingly expanding into the realm of power. Where there is power, there are brokers who also exist (Panke, 2011).

It turns out that brokers are something that is common in the world of power and politics. Politics cannot be separated from the existence of brokers (Kimble et al., 2010). In the

world of politics, a broker has an important role. The important role of a broker made him included into the politic world. Politics is concerned with gaining, sharing and maintaining political power. Political brokers bridge political parties or anyone who want to gain power from voters (Zarazaga, 2015). Actually, it is not only political parties who want to gain power by using political brokers but also groups or parties who have gained power also continue to use brokers to maintain power or regain their power (Camp, 2017).

Political brokers bridge political parties or candidates to get voters' votes. Political brokers help parties or candidates to be elected by voters in election contestations (Larreguy et al., 2017). Political parties or candidates depend on political brokers, because political brokers have access to and control information related to voters that political parties and candidates need to vote for (Schneider, 2016). Political brokers not only have access to voters and vote holders, but also have the resources to regulate and direct vote holders and owners to make their political choices (Zarazaga, 2015).

In the case of Indonesia, there is a group of political brokers who are indeed opportunistic, who only seek short-term gains, namely during political contestations, especially during the campaign period (Aspinall, 2014). Political brokers in Indonesia are often found in direct regional head election contestations. Direct regional head elections have been held since 2005. Thenceforward, many political brokers have emerged in regional head elections (Agustino, 2010).

Political brokers in regional head elections consist of various groups that have access and influence to voters, formally or not. One of them is bureaucracy (Agustino, 2014). In addition to the bureaucracy, religious leaders are also political brokers in various regional head elections in Indonesia (Faridl, 2005; Faridl, 2007; Hamid, 2010; Lubis et al., 2019; Syarif, 2016). In addition, there are also entrepreneurs who want to get projects from regional heads or other entrepreneurs who are used to getting projects from the government to become political brokers in regional head elections. This creates a new problem in local politics, namely the budget mafia (Hamudy & Rais, 2014).

On the one hand, political brokers can be seen as a form of political participation in political activities (Setiawan et al., 2020). In direct regional head elections, political participation is important. This is a form of legitimacy for the elected regional head. The higher the participation rate, the higher the legitimacy of the elected regional head (Chandra et al., 2018). It is the duty of many groups to increase political participation in regional head elections, one of which is political parties. Political parties that have administrators, members, and voters, need to be actively involved in increasing voter participation in the election of regional head candidates (Septiana, 2019). Candidates for regional heads and their winning teams also need to be actively involved to increase community participation in regional head elections (Apriani & Maharani, 2019), including the active role of the regional head election committee (Anderson, 2021).

This research reveals comprehensively, from which groups or who are the political brokers in regional head elections in Indonesia? This study also explains how the role of these political brokers during the head election contestation takes place, and how do they carry out their role as political brokers in the regional head election?

Broker is defined as a person or group who transfers one thing to another, or a party who is a liaison between one another (Meyer, 2010). Political brokers are often interpreted as people or groups who connect candidates with voters. Parties who represent voters to convey their aspirations and desires to political candidates, are usually referred to as political brokers

(Koara, 2021). This is possible, because political candidates cannot meet face-to-face with all of their potential voters (Hartati et al., 2019).

According to the British Dictionary, a broker is an intermediary for individuals or groups or other parties who do not have direct access to each other. Meanwhile, political brokers usually trade their power over the access they have, for the sake of political support for personal gain (Komito, 2011). According to Mart Bax, political brokers are intermediaries between voters and the authorities, both the government and political parties. Political brokers have an important role, because they are close to those in power, and help certain parties to gain power. Political brokers help certain parties to gain power with shortcuts (Hamudy & Rais, 2014).

Political brokers are also synonymous with power brokers. According to Merriam Webster, a power broker is a party who has the power to exercise control over the votes of certain parties in politics (Merriam-Webster, 2022). According to Vernon Jordan, political brokers or power brokers are people who see politics as an opportunity for power as access to get power from people in power. Political brokers have complex relationships with power holders, not just political relations (Sorkin et al., 2021).

## RESEARCH METHOD

This study uses a qualitative method. This study describes the phenomenon of political brokers that occurs in regional head elections in several cities in Indonesia. This research was conducted for two years, 2019-2020. During these two years, hundreds of regions in Indonesia held regional head elections, both at the provincial and district/ city levels.

Researchers collected data by conducting in-depth interviews with various informants involved in the election of regional heads. The interviewed informants consisted of the winning team for regional head candidates, village heads, political consultants, survey institutions, heads of political parties, commissioners and former general election commissions. The informants interviewed are people who are directly involved in the election of regional heads and know the existence of political brokers in regional head elections in Indonesia.

**Table 1.** Informants Interviewed In-depth

Number	Informant Initial	Positions
1	IDL	Chairperson of the Bali regional election commission
2	AN	Regional election commissioner
3	BI	Former commissioner of the district election commission
4	IGJ	Regional election commissioner
5	AG	Former sub-district head in East Java
6	WN	Director of survey and political consultancy
7	RJ	The winning team for regional head candidates in East Java
8	HS	Party leader for the period 2009-2014 in East Java
9	TF	Village head in East Java
10	RT	Former commissioner of Lampung general election commission

*Source: Compiled by the Authors 2019-2020.*

Data obtained through in-depth interviews, then presented in the form of a narrative, dissertation with relevant tables and photos. Then the results of the research are reviewed and discussed by discussing them with several other studies that are also related to political brokers that have been carried out by other researchers. Then the novelty of this research was presented, namely the model of political brokers and the pattern of operation of political brokers in regional head elections in Indonesia.

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The phenomenon of political brokers is very real in Indonesia. Political brokers involve organizing political contestations in Indonesia (Pratitaswari & Wardani, 2020). Political brokers involve money in political contests (Jati, 2021). Political brokers are considered a separate threat in Indonesian politics (Harnom et al., 2019). Regional heads in Indonesia are also inseparable from the existence of political brokers who are a threat to direct democracy (Haridison, 2022).

This study found that the political broker model in the regional head election in Indonesia is the village chief. The village chief or other designations for formal figures in the village are one of the group models that become political brokers. The village chief who became a political broker in the regional head election was found in one of the districts in East Java Province. This was conveyed by AG, one of the officials in the district government in East Java. At the time of 2010 regional head election he served as secretary of the sub-district, and in 2015 regional head election he became the sub-district head in one of the sub-districts in East Java. According to AG, voters in his area are quite dependent on the figure of the village chief. This dependence can reach 60% more.

*"Actually, if I look at the many factors, the closeness with the village head seems to play a major role, thus because the village chief already understood the situation in their respective villages, sometimes the villagers need a security factor, it is important to have followed the village head. That's why the village chief factor should not be neglected, it can be up to 60% to 75%."* (Interview with AG, former sub-district head at his home, Saturday, April 26, 2019).

This was confirmed by HS, the head of the district-level party for 2009-2014 period, who was also the head of the winning team for a regent and deputy regent candidates in East Java. *"Actually, maybe one of the factors driving the victory here is the village chief."* (Interview with HS, party leader for the 2009-2014 period, at his home, Friday, April 5, 2019). The same thing was conveyed by WN who became a consultant to win a pair of candidate for regent and candidate for deputy regent. *"I see the greatest power is in the village chief."* (Interview with WN director of survey institutions and consultants for winning regional head candidates in East Java, Friday 29 March 2019).

Village chiefs who became political brokers in regional head elections were also found in one of the regencies in Bali Province. This was conveyed by IDL, one of the commissioners of the general election commission in one of the districts in Bali Province. According to IDL, political brokers in the area have always existed. Usually political brokers come from the village communities, who have great influence at the village level. Political brokers in regional head elections have an important role because brokers help to direct the masses during elections. This is triggered by the distance between regional head candidates and voters. *"Usually the broker's opportunity happened during the general election, regional election. An example is the election of a single candidate in regent who is supported by a political broker."* (Interview with IDL, Chairman of the Regional General Election Commission in his office November 4, 2020).

Besides village chiefs who become political brokers in regional head elections are community leaders. There are two community leaders here, they are formal and informal community leaders and social organizations. It was found in one district in Lampung Province. In there, the political brokers in the regional head elections were community leaders. As stated by a former neighborhood chief commissioner of district elections in Lampung Province.

*"There are many groups who usually become vote brokers during regional head elections. However, those who play the most roles are the formal and informal community organization figures."* (Interview with a former neighborhood chief of the district election commission in Lampung Province, Saturday, December 19, 2020).

The same thing was conveyed by BI, a former commissioner of the general election commission of a district in North Sumatra Province. In North Sumatra, political brokers in regional head elections usually consist of leaders from community organizations. Figures of mass organizations, both formal and non-formal organizations, have a big influence in society. *"Political brokers are usually the source of votes in every regional head election."* (Interview with BI, commissioner of the district election commission in North Sumatra Province, 4 November 2020).

The working pattern of political brokers in regional head elections is by giving money. This was conveyed by AG, one of the former sub-district heads in East Java. According to AG, he once invited village chiefs he knew to gather. After the meeting, the village chiefs were given a large amount of transportation funds, each 10 million IDR. After the meeting, another fund was given to the village chiefs. *"I was asked to invite village chiefs from all sub-districts. There, I was asked to speak, after that the village head was given 10 million rupiahs each from the 20 village chiefs who came."* (Interview with AG, former sub-district head at his home, Saturday, April 26, 2019).

Funds received by village chiefs as political brokers in regional head elections are divided into two parts. First, funds for their own purposes, under various terms. Some call it pocket money, some call it transportation money. Second, operational funds given to voters in this case for the purpose of vote buying.

According to HS, the head of the district-level party for 2009-2014 period who was also a winning team 2010 regent and deputy regent candidate pairs, the funds given to the village chiefs were divided in two, there were operational funds for the village head himself, and there were funds to be given by the village chief to prospective voters in the village. *"Based on the information we received, there were two, of course there were operational funds and funds for the community. But at the implementation, practically, the money stopped at the village chief, it doesn't reach the community. There have been a lot of candidates who won elections in regional elections who used the village chief as broker, even though the community might complain because of not receiving money."* (Interview with HS, the head of the party at the district level for the 2009-2014 period and the winning team for the regional head candidate, at his home, Friday, April 5, 2019).

Village chiefs who become political brokers in regional head elections do not act alone. The village chief usually mobilizes people close to him, including village government officials, to meet voters. TF, one of the village chiefs that became political brokers in the regional head elections in East Java, claimed to be able to cast a maximum of 75% of the votes in his village to the supported candidate for regional head. He was able to succeed the supported regional head candidate twice.

*"Twice, since 2010 and won consecutively. Basically, we must make public attention. Now even the role of the village chief is dominant but there are also difficulties. The problem is that in*

*the context of the current village chief, he has personal political interests. Sometimes people in here have had their own selected candidate. Thank God, in here 75% votes can be controlled by the village chief.*" (TF interview with a village head in East Java, at the village hall, Tuesday, April 29, 2019).

It was confirmed by AG that the village chief usually does not work alone, he uses his government apparatus to garner support and win the candidate pair for regional head that is supported. The use of village apparatus is more effective in encouraging the winning of candidates who are supported at the voter level. *"Evenly, the village apparatus is the winning team for the village chief, evenly all of them like that, just like the president, if the president is elected his cabinets are appointed from coalition supporters, it's the same as in the village, based on the practice in the field, yes, you win, indeed there are village chiefs who are super power, although not all village chiefs are super power."* (Interview with AG, former sub-district head at his home, Saturday, April 26, 2019).

According to AN, a political broker is usually someone who plays an important role in an area, such as a village chief or neighborhood chief. They are trusted people during the election of candidates for mayor and deputy mayor or candidates for governor and deputy governor. Brokers sell voter votes to regional head candidates. *"The role of political brokers here is as a liaison between voters and candidates. In addition, they become mass guides in elections. They are also the source of votes in elections, where those votes will be bought by candidates."* (Interview with AN, the commissioner of the district election commission in Bali Province, at his office November 4, 2020). IGJ, one of the commissioners of the district general election commission, also confirmed that political brokers in the regional head elections sell voters' votes to candidates for regional heads, and regional heads buy votes from political brokers. *"The broker's role here is as a source of votes in an election. The votes will be bought by the candidate. The broker's opportunities are greater if the influence they have is also greater."* (Interview with IGJ, commissioner of the regional General Elections Commission, at the office, 4 November 2020).

The working pattern of political brokers in regional head elections does not only influence voters by giving money from regional head candidates or their winners. However, giving money is also accompanied by acts of intimidation that threaten potential voters who are not loyal to the supported choice. As happened in one district in Lampung Province. *"Not only giving money, but brokers also intimidating voters who have taken money."* (Interview with RU, former commissioner of the district election commission in Lampung Province, Saturday, December 19, 2020). The same thing was conveyed by BI, a former commissioner of the general election commission of a district in North Sumatra Province. Political brokers in regional head elections used a thug model approach. *"The results are also effective, many voters are afraid of such methods."* (Interview with BI, commissioner of the district election commission in North Sumatra Province, 4 November 2020).

Village chiefs became political brokers in regional head elections. This happens because voters use the village chief as a reference in selecting candidates. Voters are still considering the attitude of the village chief during the regional head election. As happened in the regional head election in Deli Serdang Regency, North Sumatra in 2018. As revealed by Anita Lubis and friends, the increase in voter participation in the village of Bandar Khalipah Village, Percut Seituan District, Deli Serdang Regency, North Sumatra, was an active effort of the village chiefs to increase voter participation in the regional head elections held in 2018 (Lubis et al., 2019).

The choice of the village chief is used as a reference by the voters in the village head election, because the village head is the main figure as an opinion leader at the village level.

As revealed by Wijoko Lestariono and Hendro. In a study conducted in Bukit Harapan Village, Parenggean District, East Kotawaringin Regency, Central Kalimantan, it was found that the village head was a figure who became an opinion leader (Lestariono & Hendro, 2020). The same thing happened in Bukit Rawi Village, Central Kahayan District, Pulang Pisau Regency, Central Kalimantan. As stated by Kurjunaidi, in a study conducted in 2019 (Kurjunaidi, 2019).

On the characterization side, as the ruler in the village, the village chief has the position as the ruler who had the closest relationship and interaction with the community. As happened in three villages which include Kalisidi Village, Gonoharjo Village, and Diwak Village, Ungaran Barat District, Semarang Regency, Central Java. Nugraheni Arumsari and colleagues revealed that the village heads in the three villages as the highest government heads in the village had many opportunities to interact directly with the village community they lead (Arumsari et al., 2017).

At the same time, the village chief was also a figure who protected and assured the community. Communities in the village, with a generally low level of education, certainly need a figure who can maintain security, protection and assurance. The figure was in the village chief. People need security, for their livestock, for their property, for their families. In fact, it is the main responsibility of the police. However, because the distance between the community and the police was far, the village head was the place to get security and protection guarantees. As stated by Fitriasari, the security role of the village chief was in Banyusidi Village, Pakis District, Magelang Regency, Central Java (Fitriasari, 2010). The most important of these factors is that the community still believes in the village chief. As long as the community's trust in the village chief is still high, the existence of the village chief figure is still very influential. As happened in Pengasih Village, Pengasih District, Kulon Progo Regency, Special Region of Yogyakarta (Averus & Alfina, 2020).

When the figure of the village chief still gets the trust of the community, the movement of government officials and people close to the village chief is more accepted by voters. It is because so far they have interacted a lot with village government officials, in various government affairs. Moreover, in the village, residents almost all depend on the village government for all their affairs. Not only came down with an invitation to support the candidate for regional head, but the representatives also assigned by the village chief moved at the same time giving money to prospective voters.

However, there is a condition that the village chief was no longer trusted by the community, when the village chief, the political broker, has a foot in both camps. Model having a foot in both camps and more means to support more than one candidate for regional head who participates in the contest. Likewise, village chiefs like this either receive gifts from potential regional heads or their winning teams. Under these conditions, the individual village chief distributed the votes he can influence among all the candidates he supports. If there were two candidates who were supported, then he would distribute the votes to both of them proportionally. Another model of the village chief, because he supported more than one candidate and received all the gifts from each candidate, at the time of action he did not move at all. He allowed competition of voting for the region run naturally by the winning team.

Opportunities for political brokers in regional head elections are also possible for community organization figures, both formal and normal organizations. This can be seen at least from the activities of the regional head candidate pairs who always visit community leaders during socialization and campaign. This opens up opportunities for community leaders to become political brokers during regional head elections. As figures who have influence in the community, their support is needed by prospective regional candidates (Biyanto, 2010). The support of mass organizations leaders for regional head candidates was increasingly felt



when the supporting organizations use intimidation and threats of violence against political opponents whose choices are not the same as those of mass organizations leaders. As happened in Banten, in the 2008 regional head election (Sutisna, 2017).

The existence of brokers in the political world is driven by economic benefits, both in the form of money and other materials. This statement is also expressed by Larreguy et al. The motivation of political brokers, namely the Mexican National Education Workers Union, is motivated to get incentives in the form of monetary rewards (Larreguy et al., 2017). In addition, political brokers are also driven by their interests to maintain their position and position in the workplace, as well as existence in their community (Rizzo, 2015). Similarly, Stefano Boni's research on political brokers received many projects from the winning political parties and the Venezuelan government under the leadership of Hugo Chavez (Boni, 2020). Furthermore, in regional head elections in Indonesia, political brokers are also involved in political activities because of the motivation to get money from regional head candidates and winning teams. Political brokering can also be done by taxi drivers, whose job is to transport voters to the polls, as well as monitor elections at polling stations, and bring back voters. Like what happened in Mexico (Larreguy; Marshall; Querub'i, 2016). The role of political brokers is to deliver voters to the polling stations, especially for voters who live far from the polling stations. As happened in Liberia (Bowles et al., 2020). To do so, political brokers benefit economically (Themner, 2022). Political brokers also benefit materially after the candidate they support wins and comes to power. As happened in Argentina (Zarazaga, 2014).

Political brokers behave disloyally to political parties or contestants who need them. A political broker is a party who is free to determine to which party he will direct the voter's support that can be conditioned. In each political contestation, there may be further support. This is due to the strong position of brokers rather than political parties, as happened in Brazil. Political brokers are not loyal to the party but loyal to their interests (Novaes, 2017). In Indonesia, political brokers in regional head elections also often betray supported candidates. Political brokers take goods and money that should be given to voters; some even leave one candidate and switch to another candidate (Aspinall, 2014). Such behavior of political brokers in regional head elections in Indonesia is considered a danger to democracy (Harnom et al., 2019). Surprisingly, even though they are disloyal, regional head candidates still use political brokers and spend money on them (Chalid, 2017).


This study found that political brokers in regional head elections in Indonesia bridge regional head candidates or through their winning teams with prospective voters. Henceforth, political brokers regulate the votes of potential voters given to candidates for regional heads. The political broker model for regional head elections in Indonesia consists of two. *First*, the village head. This has similarities with the political brokerage that occurred in Gana. Political brokers in Gana are from tribal chiefs (Knierzinger, 2011). *Second*, community leaders. The village head has a close relationship with the people or prospective voters. Whether there is a regional head election or no regional head election, the village head takes care of the community's interests, both administrative and other matters in the government. Likewise, community leaders also have an essential role in the community. Community leaders, both who formally become administrators of mass organizations or informally, become groups close to the community outside of government affairs. Village heads and community leaders who have a close relationship with the community of voters have easy access or accessible communication with voters. This is an opportunity and it becomes a liaison between the candidate for regional head or the winning team and the voters.

Political brokers perform their role in two ways. *First*, by giving money (money politics) to the head of the electorate. The money comes from regional head candidates who

are given by the winning team for regional head candidates for political brokers. The money given by regional head candidates to political brokers consists of money for own political broker and operational money, as well as money to be distributed to voters. *Second*, political brokers also act to intimidate, threaten and frighten potential voters, if they do not vote for candidates who are supported by political brokers.

Political brokers in regional head elections in Indonesia have a role in eliminating the direct form of regional head elections. In practice, political brokers who are in contact with regional heads, through their winning teams, carry the names of voters. In fact, political brokers do not directly represent voters. Thus, there is no direct relationship between regional head candidates and their voters. This also eliminates the sense of responsibility for the elected regional head, that he was elected not because of the voters, but because of the broker who had helped him. Finally, regional heads feel they have a relationship to maintain relations with political brokers, not with the people as voters. This of course destroys democracy.

**Picture 1.** Political Broker Model in Regional Head Elections in Indonesia



*Source: Hidayaturrahman, et al, 2021*

## CONCLUSSION

There are two models of political brokers in regional head elections in Indonesia. *First*, the village head. *Second*, community leaders both formal community leaders, and non-formal community leaders. At the same time, the pattern of operation of political brokers in regional head elections in Indonesia is to collect voters' votes to support specific regional head candidates. Voters are collected directly by visiting and meeting voters. Voters are collected in two forms. They were first influencing voters to choose specific regional head candidates accompanied by the provision of money. The amount of money given varies from tens of thousands of rupiah to hundreds of thousands of rupiah. Giving money to the head of the electorate for a dissertation with threats to voters who have received the money, to remain loyal to their choice, and not to vote for another candidate for the regional head. If found to choose

another regional head candidate, they are threatened with violence. The money received by political brokers from candidates for regional heads in Indonesia consists of two. First is money which is the operational costs and wages for their work. The money given to prospective voters is money politics or vote-buying. Even though they have received money from the regional head candidate or his winning team, political brokers are not loyal to one pair of regional head candidates. Some political brokers do not give money or materials from candidates for regional heads, heads of voters but take them for their purposes. Some even move to support one candidate to another. That way, the political broker gets twice the material advantage from the candidate for the first regional head and the second regional head. Even so, strangely, many candidates for regional heads in Indonesia still use political brokers.

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