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## **Al-Qaeda's New Orientation After the Death of Osama bin Laden**

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### **Abstract**

After the death of Osama Bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda showed a transformation from a centralized and hierarchical movement to a local and decentralized with a conflict of competition between leaders that is inseparable from the strategy of the death of the central leader and the rise of the ISIS group globally. The question to be answered in this article is how is the new orientation of the Al-Qaeda movement after the death of Osama Bin Laden and the ISIS declaration in Iraq and Syria. The methodology used is a literature review of various references, which still rarely discusses the new orientation of Al-Qaeda after the death of Bin Laden and the ISIS declaration. The conclusion obtained in the article is that the new direction from global to local is inseparable from a temporary strategy to distance itself from the anti-terrorism campaign carried out by the United States to combat ISIS groups in Iraq and Syria. The plan of Al-Qaeda, which tends not to be aggressive, is inseparable from internal consolidation and the formation of new networks at the local level, especially in Syria.

*Keywords: Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, new movement orientation*

### **Abstrak**

Setelah kematian Osama Bin Laden gerakan Al-Qaeda menunjukkan transformasi dari gerakan hierarkis yang terpusat menjadi gerakan lokal dan terdesentralisasi dengan konflik persaingan antara pemimpin yang tidak terlepas dari strategi atas kematian pemimpin utama dan kebangkitan kelompok ISIS secara global. Pertanyaan yang hendak dijawab dalam artikel ini adalah bagaimana orientasi baru gerakan Al-Qaeda pasca wafatnya Osama Bin Laden dan deklarasi ISIS di Irak dan

Suriah. Metodologi yang digunakan adalah dengan kajian pustaka atas berbagai referensi yang masih jarang membahas soal orientasi baru Al-Qaeda pasca kematian Bin Laden dan deklarasi ISIS. Kesimpulan dari penelitian ini adalah bahwa orientasi baru dari global ke lokal tidak terlepas dari strategi sementara untuk menjauhkan diri dari kampanye anti-terorisme yang diusung oleh Amerika Serikat yang berfokus untuk memerangi kelompok ISIS di Irak dan Suriah. Strategi yang cenderung untuk tidak agresif tersebut tidak terlepas dari konsolidasi internal dan pembentukan jaringan baru di tingkat lokal, terutama di Suriah.

**Keywords:** *Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, orientasi baru gerakan*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The hijacking of the aircraft crashed into the twin tower, World Trade Center (WTC), in New York City, it destroyed parts of the Pentagon building at the U.S. Department of Defense in Arlington, making the name Al-Qaeda globally known as the main actor behind the action. The horrific day of 9/11, which then sparked a war on terror campaigns followed by sending U.S. troops and coalition forces to the Middle East. The desire of the Americans for vicarious revenge (Gollwitzer et al., 2014) to kill Osama Bin Laden in a raid, rather than died in an airplane crash eventually develops in search of the Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan to Pakistan. The death of Osama Bin Laden made this organization not much active, especially followed by the declaration of the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014. Since then, the Al-Qaeda movement looks not so aggressive but still maintains and builds its campaign.

The critical question raised in this paper is, what is the orientation of the Al-Qaeda after the death of Osama Bin Laden and the ISIS declaration in Iraq and Syria? This question gap of studies related to Al-Qaeda among researchers who did not discuss the new orientation of the Al-Qaeda movement after Osama bin Laden and the ISIS declaration in Iraq and Syria. Mohamedou's study (2011), for example, discusses the mutation of the Al-Qaeda from "centralized and hierarchical groups" towards the movement of "regional and decentralized organizations" with several competing leaders after the death of Bin Laden in May 2011. The study got an interesting opening point related to how Al-Qaeda's new orientation after Osama bin Laden's death in dynamics regionally, especially in Syria.

A study about Al-Qaeda's new orientation after the death of Osama Bin Laden shows some focus on the mutations of the movement, the paradox of resilience and failure, how the movement maintaining its power quietly and expanding its footprint in Syria and Yemen, and take advantages of the possible fall of ISIS, as well as Al-Qaeda's status as an organization, network and idea (Mohamedou, 2011; Celso, 2014; Zelin et al., 2017; Hoffman, 2016). Other studies focus on the evolution of the Al-Qaeda franchise in new geographic and virtual spaces, implications for the national security of the United States, and the third decade of armed struggle between believers and people infidels that last for centuries (Atwan, 2012; Rollins, 2011; Jenkins, 2012). None of the previous studies focused on how the new orientation of the Al-Qaeda movement after Bin Laden's death and the rise of ISIS. This article starts with the historical development and formation of the

Al-Qaeda network in the world, followed by an analysis of the influence of Bin Laden's death and the rise of ISIS towards the new orientation of the Al-Qaeda movement.

As a movement, Al-Qaeda is the opposite of ISIS, declared by Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi. When ISIS was founded and then followed by attacks by U.S. coalition forces, Al-Qaeda did not help them, even though they have the same intentions in campaign jihad to the Muslim in the global world.

## **RESEARCH METHOD**

This paper describes from a literature review of various references from books, magazines, journals, and reports relating to the Al-Qaeda movement, terrorism, as well as the Middle East dynamics. Multiple researchers (such as Mohamedou, 2011; Celso, 2014; Zelin et al., 2017; Hoffman, 2016; Atwan, 2012; Rollins, 2011; and Jenkins, 2012) have widely written about these topics; still, the gap in the discussion is how the Al-Qaeda movement will look like after two significant events, the death of Osama Bin Laden and the rise of ISIS. This comparative study is an essential part of qualitative research to explain the phenomenon of the Al-Qaeda movement from several sources as well as the most up-to-date references from several analyzes and terrorism experts. These writings help the reader to get a clear picture of the strategy of Al-Qaeda after the two events. The authors realize that a more comprehensive analysis needs long and more in-depth research. However, a comparative literature study is the most rational choice to explain this phenomenon.

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS**

Discussions Al-Qaeda's new orientation after the death of Osama Bin Laden on one side and the rise of ISIS on the other side will explain from the history and the network of Al-Qaeda and the impact of the death of Bin Laden to the strategy and existence of the organization. The choice of the orientation of the Al-Qaeda determines by various internal and external dynamics that occur against them. After 9/11, the Al-Qaeda movement did not stop to engage each other and creating a new network even though the U.S. forces attack them.

### **1. Al-Qaeda's History and Network**

Al-Qaeda is an international resistance movement against the United States and the West, which was founded by Osama Bin Laden in 1988. This movement began in 1979 during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. In 1979, when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Abdullah Azzam, created an office called "service office" (*Maktab Al-Khidmat*) as a recruiting platform for Muslims who wanted to join the jihad in Afghanistan (Williams, 2002). Furthermore, according to Whittaker (2003: 42), in 1988, the office was later transformed into "a terrorist group" known as Al-Qaeda.

In the establishment of Al-Qaeda, Hussein (2008: 209) writes that this movement begun due to the absence of accurate data regarding the mujahidin who waged jihad in Afghanistan, while

many of the Muslim families asked the fate of their family members. The idea of data collection eventually expanded into an independent office. As the use of the word Al-Qaeda continues, the United States finally gets the impression that the name is as an organization or network. Osama also showed a keen interest in the other hemisphere, Southeast Asia. Conboy (2008) writes that in 1998, Bin Laden sent his brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, to the Philippines to establish a rattan export company in Manila, which was also accompanied by a series of charitable and educational organizations funded by Bin Laden.

According to Mir Zohair Husain (2003: 255) in the *Global Islamic Politics*, the location of Afghanistan as a jihad place has strategic importance. The country is known as the "land of mullahs," is geographically bordered by six other countries: China, Pakistan, Iran, and three states of the former Soviet Union (Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). The history of this country proves that the area is a commercial route that is important for the region. As a commercial route, it certainly brings its blessings and lures other states to get it. Ten years of conflict in the area (from 1979 to 1989) brought together Islamic extremists and gained training experience in war. The Communist government in Afghanistan came to power in 1978 but failed to maintain control of its territory. At the end of 1979, the Soviet government sent its military units to ensure that Afghanistan was safe under Moscow's influence. When the resistance movement of the mujahidin occurred, according to *the 9/11 Commission Report* (2004: 72), "this war resulted in defeat for the Soviet forces."

Efforts to accommodate the mujahidin and as a database, *the Bait Al-Ansar* and *Maktab Al-Khidmat* (the Service Bureau) was lead by Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden (Wright, 2006: 119). The transformation from the service bureau into Al-Qaeda has vast implications for the Western countries as well as a democratic state which not applying the Islamic rule of law. According to Marc Sageman, Marlana Telvick said that Al-Qaeda has developed from an operational organization into a more significant social movement, and has implications for the war on terror from the United States. Sageman's research on the four hundred terrorists who attacked the West and opposition to the government in his country said that Al-Qaeda had become a global jihad movement — not bound by geographical and geopolitical barriers.

Al-Qaeda has vas networking from the Arab, Africa, Western Europe until Southeast Asia. Followers of global jihad can be called nodes (influential people) who are connected by links (network connectors). Every relationship that has more links in the network is called a hub (center of activity). Al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, is a global jihad movement that has since 1998 issued fatwas on killing Americans and Jews in every place and period.

According to the 9/11 Commission Report (2004), groups of people who has a connection with one another also form a network cluster. Al-Qaeda's global network consists of four clusters made around nodes. Estimates about the number of nodes in the system are uncertain. Data released by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that around 110,000 people have been trained in Al-Qaeda camps between 1989 and October 2001. There were about 20,000 have graduated between 1996 and 2001. Quoting Hendropriyono (2009: 199), Director Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Robert Muller in his explanation in February 2003 before the American Congress stated that hundreds of those who are nodes related to Al-Qaeda live and operate in the U.S.

A.M. Hendropriyono (2009) states that in the body of Al-Qaeda consists of four clusters. The first cluster acts as the inner core or the central staff who live on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This axis consists of the highest leader (*Amir Al-'Am*), the leader of Al-Qaeda (*Al-Amir Al-Qaeda*), the Shura Council of Al-Qaeda, and four commissions (the military commission, finance, fatwa, and information). Al-Qaeda's top leader was Osama Bin Laden and the second row consists of Abu Ayyub Al-Iraqi, Abu Ubaida Al-Panjshiri (Ali Rashidi), Abu Faraj Al-Yamani, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Fadel Al-Misri, Abu Burhan Al-Kabir, Abu Hafez (Muhammad Atef), Abu Mush'ab As-Su'udi, and Izzuddin As-Su'udi.

The Shura Council is Al-Qaeda's highest institution with 31 core figures. This institution functions to provide consideration, opinions, and advice to *Amir Al-'Am* Osama Bin Laden. The thirty-one members, in addition to Bin Laden and the names of Al-Qaeda's top officials, include Abu Ibrahim Al-Iraqi, Abu Fadel Al-Makki, Sayyid Al-Misri, Qari Said Al-Jazairi, Khalifah Masqat Al-Omani, Saiful Al-Liby, and Abu Muhammad As-Su'udi. Under the Shuro Assembly, there are several committees. The Military Committee led by Abu Ubaidah Al-Panjshiri until he died drowning in Lake Victoria (Tanzania) in 1996, then it was continue led by Abu Hafez, who subsequently was hit by an American fighter in Kandahar. At present, this committee leading by former Egyptian colonel Saiful Adel. The Military Commission is responsible for conducting recruiting (rejuvenation), training, and carrying out terrorist operations. The Military Commission has built and held exercises in more than forty military camps spread across Afghanistan and several other countries such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Indonesia, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. For the Indonesian context, military training has a location in Poso, Central Sulawesi. Poso conflict occurs between Muslims and Christians. In 2000 under the supervision of Al-Qaeda cadres from Spain named Omar Bandon and Jusuf Galan, the exercise was carried out. His second trip from Madrid to Poso via Bali has guidance from an Al-Qaeda link named Parlindungan Siregar by managing funds, which were only about 50 million U.S. dollars before 9/11.

Also, Al-Qaeda has a Financial Committee headed by Abu Fadel Al-Makki and Abu Hamam As-Su'udi. The commission has the power to circulate their money circulation into the network across the globe. By relying on an informal banking system called *hawala*, funds have been transferred through administrative boundaries and without the knowledge of the national governments. The Al-Qaeda Fatwa Committee is chaired collectively by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Fadel Al-Misiri, Abu Faraj Al-Yamani, Abu Qatada, and Abu Hajar. The Fatwa Commission deals with the postulates of Islam to compile political praxis. The leader of the Information Committee or media is headed by Abu Mush'ab, nicknamed Abu Reuters (taking from name *Reuters* news agency). This task is to share information to the world.

The leaders and core members of Al-Qaeda come from two militant Islamic factions from Egypt, namely Al-Jihad led by Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Jama'ah Islamiyah led by visually inspired cleric Umar Abdurrahman. Al-Qaeda is said to have institutional relations, with no organizational ties to other institutions in more than 50 countries, including Britain, Germany, Canada, the United States, Albania, and Tanzania (Fachry, 2008: 56-58). This assumption can be seen at least from Robin Wright (in Husain, 2003: 282), who said that Bin Laden established recruitment centers in more than 50 countries to find volunteers to wage jihad. The recruitment centers of the volunteers could be a forerunner to cooperation with Al-Qaeda because they previously had the same vision in dealing with the Soviet invasion.

According to Hendropriyono, a central staff structure that has the characteristics of such a military organization makes the organization more flexible to maneuver (to move quickly). At the Military Commission, it has relations with four other clusters in various regions, including with organizations outside Al-Qaeda. The relationship task is to provide technical assistance, such as military exercises conducted by Al-Qaeda for Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI) in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in 2000. The destruction of the clandestine (underground or secret) organization of the Jama'ah Islamiyah in Indonesia blurred relations. The blur was evident from the sharp explosion of a grenade made by Pindad on February 5, 2008, in a garage on Jalan Gatot Subroto, Jakarta. The second explosion that occurred on 15 February 2008 at the fork in the Keboiwo road, Denpasar, Bali, was not indicated at all with Al-Qaeda.

The second cluster in the Al-Qaeda movement is the position occupied by Al-Qaeda members in Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Kuwait. In the book *The Secret History of Al-Qa'ida*, Abdel Bari Atwan explains that since May 2003, al-Qaeda has opened its new branch in the Arabian Peninsula. They struggle to criticize the government of Saudi Arabia. There are at least two groups who want change in Arabia, namely the liberal opposition, which is an education graduate from campuses in America and Europe, and a jihadist group that demands change with weapons. In addition to concentrating on domestic issues, Al-Qaeda in Arabia also continues to target foreign targets (Fachry, 2008: 215). The Arab cluster has a closed connection to other militant groups such as Al-Tawhid in Egypt and Al-Jihad (the Egyptian Islamic Jihad), who joined Al-Qaeda ahead of 9/11. Al-Jihad is led by Ayman Al-Zawahiri. According to the Center for Defense Information (CDI), the first success of the Al-Jihad movement was in 1981 by assassinating Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. This group has been active since the 1970s, as one of the progress within the Muslim Brotherhood. In the 1980s, the Egyptian authorities acted violently by imprisoning their members. In the end, because of the pressure that came, this movement broke into two led by Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Abbud Al-Zumar. Aside from Al-Jihad, joining this cluster are also some organizations in Yemen.

The third cluster is the Maghreb Arabs Cluster or known as Tandzim Al-Qaeda Bilad Al-Magrib Al-Islami (Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghrib States) or Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The Maghrib region includes countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia. Initially, this movement stood alone. Still, on September 13, 2006, a movement called Jama'ah As-Salafiyyah li Ad-Da'wah wa Al-Qital or in French was called "Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat" (GSPC) (Salafi Da'wah Movement and Jihad) under the leadership of Abu Musaab Abdul Wadud joined al-Qaeda. It can be said that this movement is a splinter faction of the Algerian-based Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which is simultaneously involved in efforts to overthrow the secular government of Algeria. The GSPC broke away from the GIA in 1996. In 1998, this movement vowed to end attacks on civilians. The reason for the GSPC merger was because "the kuffar have united in destroying Islam, for that the mujahidin must unite to face the demons who have united." This movement has links with the Moroccan Salafia Jihad (MSJ), and the Former Group Islamique Arme (Hendropriyono, 2009: 202, Fachry, 2008: 219-221). Some MSJ leaders released by the Global Jihad website on May 29, 2009, were: Hassan Kettani, Abdelwaheb Rafiki, known as Abu Hafsh, Omar Haddouchi, Abdelhaq Moulabbat, and Muhsin Khaibar. Whereas the Former Group Islamique Arme (Armed Islamic Group/Arabic Al-

Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah Al-Musallaha), according to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) website, is a movement that opposed the secular military regime in Algeria in the 1990s.

In the fourth cluster, namely the Southeast Asian region consisting of Jama'ah Islamiyah (J.I.) and its cells in Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia. According to Rohan Gunaratna in *Inside Al-Qaeda*, "Al-Qaeda has expanded its influence in Southeast Asia by utilizing the internet, infiltrating Muslim non-governmental organizations, sending extreme religious leaders to the region and training activists in Afghanistan." He further said that Al-Qaeda's involvement in Southeast Asia included providing funds and military training for several militant Islamic groups in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines and planned to deepen its influence in the Southeast Asian region of approximately 210 million Muslims (Nainggolan et al. 2002: 140-141). Included in this fourth cluster are the Moro Islamic Liberation Front movement, the Moro National Liberation Front, and Abu Sayyaf guerrillas in the Philippines. Unlike the characteristics of the inner relationship, the relationship between the inner circle and the other three clusters is tenuous and adopts a decentralized system.

The movements carried out by Al-Qaeda in groups other than the core axis can be carried out without the knowledge of central Al-Qaeda, because the system is decentralized. What is essential in this collaboration is that a common goal to fight America. Continuing the picture of the four clusters, according to Hendropriyono, the organizational structure of Al-Qaeda as a whole is different from other terrorist movements in the past. Its characteristics change, and its shape is horizontal, does not follow the hierarchy of military organizations, is more streamlined, more linear, and is more organizationally networked than other groups. Authority in this group is very vital because it's dynamic and more goal-oriented than rule-oriented (Hendropriyono, 2009: 199-204). Another advantage of the Al-Qaeda movement is that each node can connect with other nodes through countless paths, with obstacles that are difficult for others to enter and exit this flexible network. With so many trails, this movement has more of a long "breath" for action. If one lane is cut off, the other path is still safe and does not rule out the possibility of opening a new road again.

How does Al-Qaeda influence in Southeast Asia? A.M. Hendropriyono (2009) writes that one of Al-Qaeda's four clusters is in the Jama'ah Islamiyah (J.I.) in Southeast Asia, which was first led by Abdullah Sungkar. Although there is no organizational command relationship, movements in Southeast Asia, like J.I., have a shared vision with Al-Qaeda. Hijazi (2009: 85), wrote that "Al-Qaeda as an organization, stands at the level: active cells and sleep cells spread in various countries in the world, Islamic groups accused of wasting to Al-Qaeda and has thought and organizational ties with Al-Qaeda. Although it is difficult to detect groups like this, we can see some of these groups, such as the Qoidah al-Jihadist organization Bilad Al-Rafidain (Tandzim Al-Qaeda Iraq), Jama'ah Islamiyah (J.I.) in Indonesia (where one of the members in the Bali Bombing I)."

Rohan Gunaratna (2009) mentions that the Al-Qaeda movement has expanded its influence in Southeast Asia by utilizing the internet, infiltration of Muslim non-governmental organizations, sending extreme religious leaders, and training people in Afghanistan. No less than 210 million Muslims inhabit the Southeast Asian region. In such conditions, many predict that Southeast Asia can become fertile ground for the development of Al-Qaeda and a safe hiding place for its members who are the target of the U.S. government. The existence of this movement began to be sued and questioned when various bomb blasts occurred in ASEAN countries. People are suspicious of Al-Qaeda and its network when a devastating explosion that killed 185 people occurred on Kuta Beach

in Bali on October 12, 2002. A few days later, there was also a bomb explosion in Zamboanga (Philippines), which killed three people.

Information about Al-Qaeda and its groups in Southeast Asia began after the Taliban Government in Afghanistan suffered defeat. The Singapore Intelligence Service received information that the Northern Alliance had captured Taliban troops from Southeast Asia. From this information, Singapore arrested 15 members of the Jama'ah Islamiyah in December 2001 on charges of planning a bombing of U.S. and other Western targets in Singapore. Wangke writes, "This group is strongly suspected of having links to Al-Qaeda because they were confiscated with photos, bombs, video footage of the target of the attack, fake passports, fake immigration stamps, and some documents which related to Al-Qaeda. The Singaporean government says some of them have gone to Afghanistan to undergo military training in Al-Qaeda's military camp" (see Nainggolan et al., 2002). The number of those detained increased again when, in August 2002, the Singaporean government arrested 21 suspected terrorists. Nineteen of the suspects were members or had been members of the Jama'ah Islamiyah, while the other two had links to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. With this arrest, the Singapore Government has arrested 34 terrorist suspects without going through court proceedings thanks to the homeland security act. Also, they seize ransom from the police so that it can be exchanged for captured jihadists and ransom catches from foreign tourists, especially those from the United States, Thailand, or their allies to be exchanged for captive Mujahidin in Indonesia. Also, they began to regularly attack Indonesian police or soldiers so that they would free the mujahidin who spend their time as a prisoner. The statement of attitudes in the name of the Al-Qaeda Tandzim in Southeast Asia written in the name of Abu Ubaidah, "Muhajir and Mujahid Pattani Darussalam Accredited to the End of the Al-Qaeda Tandzim of Southeast Asia."

From the above explanation, it can be concluded that Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia did not appear formally (even today, 2019). Indications of the bombings that occurred in this region along with signs that the action was carried out by Al-Qaeda and those who were in the same vision showed that Al-Qaeda in this region did not appear openly, but was in the form of a formless organization (Sahasrad, Syukur, Al Chaidar, Tabrany, and Ridwan, 2019) or clandestine. Because this type of organization is secret, members keep the organization secret and do not show it publicly. Al-Qaeda in this matter exists, but because it is confidential, so it is not exposed to the public. Jama'ah Islamiyah, which one of the Al-Qaeda networks, is not structurally under Al-Qaeda, because there has not been an official statement from the central Al-Qaeda that J.I. is a branch of Al-Qaeda. The Al-Qaeda movement in Southeast Asia is engaged in networks, not in the name of Al-Qaeda. Individually, Afghan alumni who returned to their territory in Southeast Asia shared the same vision of struggle with Al-Qaeda Osama bin Laden. However, organizational or structural command, strong evidence has not yet been found that there have been Al-Qaeda Tanzim (with the name "Al-Qaeda") in Southeast Asia.

How is Al-Qaeda in Indonesia? In the International Herald Tribune news headline entitled "Southeast Asia Bars Help of U.S. Troops" (December 14, 2001), Hendropriyono said that Al-Qaeda had collaborated with radical groups in Poso in the case of a dispute between Muslim and Christian groups. The conflict took several years and involved Muslims outside Poso, including those from Afghan jihadi veterans. The influx of Al-Qaeda's influence can be observed from the existence of the Jama'ah Islamiyah network (the fourth cluster of Al-Qaeda) operating in Poso.



Operations carried out in this area are mostly the call of jihad to help oppressed Muslims in a place. The Observer News, Sunday, November 20, 2005, wrote, "For jihadists throughout the archipelago and beyond, the tension in Poso calls for the fight against 200,000 Christians. In the summer of 2001, with little effort by the government to stop their migration, thousands of militants, mainly from banned groups such as Laskar Jihad (L.J.) and Jama'ah Islamiyah (J.I.), had traveled here with weapons, conducting military training from Afghanistan and the mission to expel the infidels)." In responding to that fact, the Indonesian government took a cautious stance because there was no clear fact that Al-Qaeda was active in Indonesia. One of the reasons for this caution is that Indonesia is a safe area, not a war zone like in Palestine or Afghanistan.

Indeed, after months of the government insisting that Al-Qaeda is not operating in Indonesia, it finally supported a public statement in December in which intelligence services recognized the existence of Al-Qaeda training camps in Indonesia. Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda once denied having evidence that local Muslim organizations have links to international terrorist networks. But one month later, Indonesia signed an agreement with Australia to fight international terrorism. Until the 2002 Bali Bombing, Indonesian officials such as Vice President Hamzah Haz began to trust the signal, even Defense Minister Matori Abdul Jalil said the Bali Bombers were carried out by Al-Qaeda with the help of Indonesians. Abdurrahman Wahid boldly mentioned that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), Habib Rizieq Shihab (Front Pembela Islam), and Ja'far Umar Thalib (Laskar Jihad) as "a local terrorists" because they always used violence and carried weapons everywhere (liputan6.com, October 1, 2002). Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Ja'far Umar Thalib have a connection to Al-Qaeda, but Ba'asyir was closer than Talib. Ba'asyir was allegedly the leader of the Jama'ah Islamiyah (J.I.) as one of Al-Qaeda's links.

In late July 2002, Indonesia announced that five Al-Qaeda members planning to attack the U.S. Embassy. President Bush then sent a secret Delta Force team to Jakarta to increase security, but the incident did not occur. Three months later (October), a new bomb exploded in Bali on October 12, 2002 (Syukur, 2012). Jones (2009) saw the incident with three theories. First, the American embassy issued a warning to its citizens to avoid public places in Indonesia twelve hours before the explosion. The CIA chose an area frequented by Americans and supplied materials for bombs. From that incident, Al-Qaeda and Islamic radicals were accused. These was done as an effort to win support for the war on Iraq and offered to assist in the investigation as a way to infiltrate American troops into Indonesia so that America could finally build a new footing in Southeast Asia. The second theory, according to Jones, is common among Indonesians living in conflict areas. This theory shows that the Indonesian National Army (TNI) is the culprit. The TNI has tried since the fall of Soeharto to reaffirm its role in provoking the government with conflict and then came to establish order. Proponents of this theory state that in reality, the army supported the formation of Laskar Jihad (L.J.), or the involvement of special forces soldiers in the death of Papuan independence leader, Theys Eluay. The struggle between the army and police to control internal security has become increasingly bitter and violent in the past year. The third theory is Al-Qaeda's theory, but it has few supporters. This theory sees that the relentless U.S. pressure on the Indonesian government to act against Indonesian citizens associated with the Jama'ah Islamiyah illicit network has convinced many Indonesians that their security services are forced to accept U.S. versions of events. The information of Umar Al-Faruq, a man who arrested in West Java in

June 2002, is indeed evidence that there are plans by the Al-Qaeda group to kill President Megawati.

The day after the Bali Bombing (October 13, 2002), according to Soeripto, Australian Prime Minister John Howard accused Al-Qaeda of the attack. U.S. President, George Walker Bush, on the same day with Howard's statement, via CNN broadcast said that the pattern of bombings in Bali was similar to the model carried out by Middle Eastern terrorists. From Israel, the Zionist state's Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), on that day, bravely addressed the Islamic militants associated with Al-Qaeda as the perpetrators of the attack. Furthermore, Yael Shahr accused Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as the first party to be suspected of involvement. British media, the Guardian, on October 15, 2002, took the opinion of Rohan Gunaratna said that Indonesia is an area that quickly becomes a den of terrorists. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, long before the Bali Bomb, had accused Baasyir as a Muslim terrorist figure and as the leader of the Jama'ah Islamiyah. In May 2002, Lee also mentioned the existence of Al-Qaeda's sleeping army in Indonesia. This accusation is further strengthened by news in Time magazine (December 17, 2002) by quoting the CIA who claimed that Umar Al-Faruq claimed that Al-Qaeda had twice tried to assassinate President Megawati Sukarnoputri (Syukur, 2012).

Wangke writes that the dismantling of Al-Qaeda cells in Southeast Asia shows that Osama bin Laden cleverly changed the terrorism network system by no longer focusing on al-Qaeda as an organization, but spread as parasites in various separatist groups or residents throughout the world (Nainggolan et al.:143-144). The issue of terrorism campaigned by America, also to find new targets in the war on terror. The Guardian (October 10, 2001) mentions that the aim of Islamic groups in Southeast Asia that have links to Osama bin Laden. Three countries are called "terrorist dens": Indonesia, the Philippine, and Malaysia. Indonesia, as a Muslim majority country, has become an easy target for terrorists. Jonathan Weisman wrote a report in the USA today that the Pentagon has scheduled a plan to send troops to Indonesia. The objective is to silence radical Islamic groups suspected of being an extension of the Al-Qaeda network and considered threatening American interests in Southeast Asia. Citing U.S. intelligence sources, USA Today writes that dozens of Al-Qaeda operators at the time roam freely in the region of 17,000 islands, have hundreds of millions of Muslims, and have 34,000 miles of coastline. Information about the existence of Al-Qaeda in Indonesia was obtained from the results of monitoring activities in and out of the Middle East waters, as well as monitoring activities around the borders of Pakistan and Iran. President Bush once mentioned Iraq, Yemen, and Indonesia as targets for the next operation after Afghanistan. When the Financial Review reporter on March 15, 2002, asked him if Indonesia was hesitant—like Somalia—in dealing with terrorism, what would America do? Bush replied, "We will take action to protect the safety of citizens and the U.S. national interest. We will not hesitate to do it."

According to the author, to date, there has been no clarity in the al-Qaeda network in Southeast Asia. However, coordinatively, the possibility that this movement exists (in the form of an underground organization, clandestine) shows indications in that direction. It shows a connection to Bin Laden's fatwa on the killing of Americans and Jews (civil and military) wherever they are. Jones (2009), wrote that it was never clear whether Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia existed. Even if there is a relationship with Noordin, one possibility is that the Abu Ubaidah group borrowed the name Al-Qaeda only because it agreed with Osama's ideology, not because they were under

the authority of the central Al-Qaeda leadership. Although it could happen, there is not a single point of evidence that Noordin and some other Southeast Asians have taken allegiance to Al-Qaeda members.

## **2. The Impact of Bin Laden's Death and the Rise of ISIS**

Osama Bin Laden's death affected the existence of the Al-Qaeda movement. As a philanthropist who issued his finances to the Mujahidin and was involved in the war against Russia, Bin Laden has high charisma. At least, his charisma is seen from the point of being both generous and mujahidin. These two things later strengthened the Afghan war veterans to join the caravan of the Al-Qaeda. Without charisma, it is difficult for the ex-Afghan war to join. However, after Bin Laden died in Abbottabad, Pakistan, the situation changed. Although Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden's right-hand man who once led the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Jamaah, has replaced Bin Laden, his charisma is different from Bin Laden's. During Ayman's leadership, he didn't do many big maneuvers, like Bin Laden. Ayman maintained the spirit of Al-Qaeda's resistance to the West but did not appear to be progressive. However, in underground Ayman continued to make unreadable movements, primarily when ISIS was being targeted by U.S. and coalition forces. Al-Qaeda chose to move underground again and did not show any meaningful action.

So, what did Al Qaeda do after these two incidents? First, the consolidation of the movement. Colin P. Clarke and Charles Lister (2019) wrote that after 9/11 and the death of Bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda movement is weak, and the leadership was continued to Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Hamza Bin Laden. Ayman is said to be in poor health, does not use communication equipment, and is in an isolated place in Pakistan. Meanwhile, Hamza Bin Laden, Osama Bin Laden's son, is said to have died. Since its appearance in August 2015, Hamza was rumored to be a "young lion," a figure who would take over the leadership of Al-Qaeda from Ayman (Lister, 2019). Since ISIS established in 2014, Al-Qaeda has been consolidating by secretly moving the gravity of the movement from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Syria. This shift in the center of gravity is part of the way "to capitalize on the civil war in Syria." (Clarke and Lister, 2019)

After the 9/11 attacks, Al-Qaeda did look more calm, quiet, and made smooth movements. They did not take a significant action because it very needs for consolidation. However, the vision of the movement to attack the West remained in their campaign. That is, although the movement seemed calm, especially after ISIS took control of Iraq and Syria, they still maintained the same vision when Osama Bin Laden was still there, namely attacking Western interests.

Generally, many experts see that the shift of the Al-Qaeda movement from its aggressive to silent forms are based on limited local strategic objectives. They did not strengthen their global network, but instead increased their base in Syria. Al-Qaeda chose localism in that position. Clark and Lister (2019) called "controlled pragmatism" and "strategic patience." the controlled pragmatism is intended by Al-Qaeda as a movement that does not have to be large and global, but focuses on a particular place that is considered strategic for the basis of the jihad action. Meanwhile, strategic patience is understood as "a silent movement" in the midst of the intense U.S. campaign

and coalition forces to destroy ISIS. Al-Qaeda, as a counter-ISIS movement chose to let ISIS bear the enormous burden of the counter-terrorism movement from the West, while secretly carrying out internal consolidation.

What forms of controlled pragmatism and strategic patience? In Syria, Al-Qaeda established the Al-Nusra Front, which *the counterextremism.com* website calls “Al-Qaeda affiliated organizations, Islamists, jihadists, Qutbists, Salafists, and Sunnis”, focusing on channeling the energy of the movement locally, prohibiting the law criminal, building alliances across the Islamic and non-Islamic spectrum (besides ISIS), and participating from the possibility of building effective governance. The Al-Nusra Front gained a strategic place in Syria. Still, the effect then was that they became “very independent” and naturally became distant from the central Al-Qaeda leadership in South Asia. The decisions taken by Al-Nusra are more strategic and fast and do not consolidate with the center of the movement. This fact shows because of the distance that is not close, as well as the leader of Al-Qaeda Ayman Al-Zawahiri does not use communication tools and the need for rapid strategic decision making.

In 2016, as its name continued to rise, the Al-Nusra Front then saw that there were obstacles when they were attached to Al-Qaeda. The name Al-Qaeda is very bad and people see like a suspicion, paranoia, and people tend not to believe so much. This is an obstacle for Al-Nusra to be trusted by various people. So, they then transformed in a new name, Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham or “Liberation Sham Front,” and later evolved again with the name Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham which means “Life of Liberation of Sham.” Both names remained oriented to locality (Sham, or Syria) and pretend to “free” Syria from various things that make the region not independent, one of which is ISIS. When Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham was announced to the public, they were ultimately not regarded as “a loyal member of the Al-Qaeda family,” which of course, was useful as a local strategy to win the hearts of many people.

However, Hayat Tahrir was later crack again. A group of people saw that the Hayat movement was already impure, unclear, and had an “evolutionarily invalid” phase because, as an Al-Qaeda-based link, it was assumed that it should applying Al-Qaeda’s strategy. Those who separated then established Tanzim Huras Al-Din, which means religious guard organization, whose footing is based on the instructions of Al-Qaeda’s leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri. There is a kind of “longing” for the veterans to return to the Osama Bin Laden-style Al-Qaeda movement amidst the changing orientation of the locally-oriented Al-Qaeda leaders. This group does not focus on territorial control, but instead focuses on avoiding oneself from groups that are considered impure Al-Qaeda, and remains oriented towards attacks on “far enemies” (the West), and “near enemies” (local government/different local groups).

When started at the end of 2017, the Tanzim Huras Al-Din group was led for the first time by Samir Hijazi or Abu Hammam Al-Shami, a military figure with extensive experience in Jordan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, before he settled in Syria in 2012. Hijazi is a close figure with Al-Qaeda's military figure, Saiful Adel, and had previously worked with Abu Mush'ab Al-Zarqawi in military training in Iraq. At present, writes Clarke and Lister (2019), Hijazi has been replaced by another figure, namely Khalid Al-Aruri or Abu Al-Qassam Al-Urduni, who is close to Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Aruri himself is one of the three central Al-Qaeda deputy leaders under Ayman, along with two al-Qaeda figures in Iran as house arrest, namely Saif al Adel and Abdullah

Ahmed Abdullah or Abu Mohammad Al-Masri. Also, Aruri is known as one of the twelve members of the Al-Qaeda shura assembly.

The internal evolution of the Al-Nusra Front then transformed into Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, and Tanzim Huras Al-Din, explaining that internally the Al-Qaeda movement was inseparable from the internal rift (Hage Ali, 2018). The choice of the flag used as a movement becomes dialectics, which is not easy for internal Al-Qaeda. That is, three brands that were born in Syria in a period of only a few years explain the internal rift as well as the weakness of Al-Qaeda under Ayman. This could be due to the decreasing charisma of the leader of Al-Qaeda from Osama Bin Laden to Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who looked softer than Bin Laden. Or, it also explains that the terrorism movement is not static movement, but dynamic and loaded with internal dialectics that separates and unites them at the same time. In the Indonesian context, for example, the birth of Jama'ah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) is inseparable from the internal dialectics that color the thoughts and movements of activists who are pro to the establishment of an Islamic state in extreme ways. In fact, within the body of JAD itself, there are many variations make it difficult for observers to map whether the acts of terror (*amaliyah*) from JAD or not. Dita Upriyanto (including his wife and four children), according to *Kompas.com* (May 25, 2018) the suicide bombers is a mentally ill, a frustration with life and do not understand Islam well, said Aman Abdurrahman, JAD leader. This fact shows that there are variations in thoughts and movements in JAD that are sometimes difficult to understand, including, in this case, the stabbing done by Abu Rara on Menkopolhukam Wiranto in Menes Square, Pandeglang, towards the end of President Joko Widodo's leadership (see Syukur, 2019).

The second significant action by Al-Qaeda after the death of Bin Laden and the ISIS declaration is by not attacking the West despite the opportunities for that in Syria. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, as Al-Qaeda's number one, had ordered the Al-Nusra Front not to attack the West in Syria. At that time, there was indeed a group called the Khorasan Group, a small group of Al-Qaeda followers who were about to attack the West in Northern Syria. Ayman's instructions are intended as part of Al-Qaeda's focus on locality and avoid Western scrutiny. That is, Al-Qaeda in Ayman's time chose to consolidate underground rather than act openly.

Ayman Al-Zawahiri also reiterated the importance of Al-Qaeda's global struggle. Even though it is underground, their target to attack the West is maintained, or what Sajjan M. Gohel (2017) calls an attempt to keep the "international relevance, survival and sustainability" of the Al-Qaeda movement. The single narrative that was built that "America is at war with Islam" is still maintained in Al-Qaeda as an offer of "a sense of identity" and meaning for the lives of its followers (Schmid, 2014), so that followers can continue to fight the West. For instance, according to Gohel (2017), Al-Zawahiri said that it's the time for them to focus on moving the war to the heart of the homes and cities of Western crusaders, and especially America. He also calling on followers to carry out single attacks such as attacks on behalf of Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) for the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo on January 7, 2015.

This fact explains that Ayman still held bin Laden's 1998 fatwa that allowed the attack on the civilian and military West. However, during poor and remote health conditions in Pakistan, it is seen that Al-Qaeda in Ayman's time experienced various internal obstacles (dialectics, divisions), which made its movement weaker. Also, the presence of ISIS, which controlled a territory the size of England, made people who were pro armed struggle in the name of Islam prefer

ISIS because they were no longer considered as a resistance group but had become a state. Those who join ISIS see that there is high progressivity from the ISIS which has controlled the area to establish the Islamic state rather than Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda just shows more as a resistance movement without progressivity in the establishment of the state. If seen from the vision of Al-Qaeda, actually, they also want to establish an Islamic state, but it is different from the ISIS group. Osama Bin Laden also actually has stages of the vision of the Islamic Caliphate, but in his opinion, "it is too early" rather than something more important that is "provoking American anger" (Byman, 2019; Musharbash, 2008). At this point, there is a kind of competition between al-Qaeda and ISIS groups in the arena of global resistance against the West.

## **CONCLUSION**

Based on the above explanation related to the history and development of the Al-Qaeda network globally and the emergence of the ISIS movement that founded the Islamic State which was attacked by U.S. forces and coalitions, the authors conclude that after the death of Osama Bin Laden and the ISIS state's declaration, Al-Qaeda chose to do a new strategy from global to local. This can be seen from the formation of the Al-Nusra Front in Syria, which became an "extension" of Al-Qaeda in the area of civil war conflict. However, what is dynamic here is the presence of dialectic movements with transformations that are not coordinated and cause divisions. The split was seen when the Al-Nusra Front was about to transform into Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, and Tanzim Huras Al-Din. The transformation was seen as a strategy to gain influence at the local level but gave birth to internal divisions.

Finally, this paper argues that the narrative of Al-Qaeda in the Ayman Al-Zawahiri era remained the same as in the time of Osama Bin Laden, namely the war between Islam and the West. Although his movements appear to be moving underground, Al-Qaeda still maintains the narrative of "war againts the west." The effect then is that when ISIS has been failed (currently heading to that point), Al-Qaeda's resistance to the West with this narrative may globalize again and then revive sleeping cells outside Syria and neighboring countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. As explained above that supporter of Al-Qaeda are spread in various countries, which as "sleeping cells," so they can rise again. Practically, all the world should to anticipate the potential attacks by Al-Qaeda followers in the world after the fall of Islamic State in Irak and Suriah.

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