

The Arrangement of Dynastic Politics in Regional Head Elections in Indonesia

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Abstract

The practice of dynastic politics has been going on for almost 20 years, arguably the first and longest-existing dynasty in Kediri Regency. The research questions in this paper are: how do political dynasties in Indonesia operate and maintain power? And how can political dynasties in Kediri Regency develop? This research explains the origins or history of this dynasty, which began with business affairs and then progressed to politics. In the development of this dynasty, only those closest to the party are capable and able to implement or continue programs that have been created and not yet implemented. Many relatives, from businessmen to officials, from the village to the regional level, are ready to help and serve this dynasty in order to obtain rewards. This dynasty will also continue to occur if the regulations or laws governing a democratic system do not undergo definite changes. Because of its inclusive and closed nature, a political dynasty is very difficult to find fault with. At first glance, there is nothing wrong with dynastic politics, especially when referring to the democratic principle that every citizen has the same right to be elected and to vote. However, it cannot be denied that the political dynasties that have developed so far have harmed the essence of democracy itself.

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Abstrak

Praktik politik dinasti yang sudah berjalan hampir 20 tahun, bisa dibilang dinasti di Kabupaten Kediri merupakan yang pertama dan terlama eksistensinya. Adapun yang menjadi rumusan masalah dalam tulisan ini adalah bagaimana dinasti politik di Indonesia bekerja dan mempertahankan kekuasaan? dan bagaimana dinasti politik di Kabupaten Kediri bisa berkembang?. Penelitian ini menjelaskan awal mula atau sejarah sebuah dinasti ini terjadi berawal dari urusan bisnis lalu lanjut ke arah politik, dalam perkembangan dinasti ini hanya orang-orang terdekatlah mampu dan bisa menjalankan atau meneruskan program-program yang sudah dibuat dan belum terlaksana dan banyak kerabat mulai dari golongan pengusaha serta pejabat, baik dari tingkat desa hingga daerah yang siap membantu dan mengabdikan kepada dinasti ini dengan tujuan akan mendapatkan imbalan balik. Dinasti ini juga akan terus terjadi apabila peraturan atau undang-undang yang mengatur sebuah sistem demokrasi tidak mengalami perubahan yang secara pasti. Karena sifatnya yang inklusif dan tertutup membuat sebuah dinasti politik menjadi sangat sulit dicari sebuah kesalahannya. Sekilas tidak ada yang salah dengan politik dinasti. Terlebih jika mengacu pada dalil demokrasi bahwa setiap warga negara memiliki hak yang sama untuk dipilih dan memilih. Namun, tidak dapat dimungkiri bahwa dinasti politik yang berkembang selama ini telah mencederai esensi demokrasi itu sendiri.

INTRODUCTION

Following the end of the authoritarian New Order regime in 1998, the spirit and passion for democracy grew everywhere. Haryanto believes¹ this situation transformed the political system and gave rise to reform, providing an opportunity for democratization in Indonesia. Regarding the scope of actors wielding power, Tb. Massa Djafar² observes a shift in the role of actors involved in the power process, with the actors involved becoming increasingly pluralistic.

Vertically, the shift in power indicates that politics is no longer dominated by the central government. Democracy, while not always easy to achieve, is believed by many to be the most appropriate path, in accordance with human nature, which demands equality, freedom, and shared participation, to realize a better future for the governance of society and the state. Therefore, various efforts to restructure the political system as a form of democratization have been carried out in various domains of political life, starting from the implementation of elections, the restructuring of state political institutions, new arrangements for central-regional government relations, the strengthening of interest groups, and so on.³ However, the path to democracy is not always easy to achieve. Such a phenomenon also occurred in Indonesia after the collapse of the authoritarian New Order regime. The transition from a non-democratic, centralistic regime to a truly democratic government and political life proved to be difficult.

Various obstacles and distortions color the political landscape and the agenda of democratic consolidation in Indonesia. One problematic obstacle, which also constitutes a distortion in the framework of democratization and better political governance, is the emergence of political dynasties in various regions. The presence of political dynasties, especially at the local level, within the paradoxical landscape of democratic consolidation and development in Indonesia,

according to data released by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri), has proven to be quite massive. This political dynasty phenomenon shows signs of spread and expansion (proliferation) into the arena of power and political positions in legislative institutions, both central and regional. Political dynasties are a problem that is suspected to have existed in Indonesia since the rise of our first president, Ir. Soekarno, to power.

Although political dynasties do not violate democratic rules, in practice they stifle social mobilization, as power is associated with only certain social groups. Political dynasties are currently widespread in Indonesia. These political dynasties began to emerge in the Reformation Era, which is known for its democratic character. In a democratic government, the people should have greater opportunities to participate in the political process. Furthermore, the people are given the freedom to elect their representatives, in this case, mayors or regents. However, these political dynasties provide very little opportunity for public participation in the political process because those who become leaders are related to each other.

Political dynasties are used as a political strategy to maintain power. This can occur due to the stagnation of political party cadres in recruiting qualified regional head candidates, thus creating political pragmatism by encouraging relatives of regional heads to become public officials. Political dynasties are a negative excess of regional autonomy that causes democracy to be hijacked by the circulation of core genealogical relationships, based on kinship and outside the genealogical line, which have an interest in perpetuating family power. This is what then triggers relatives to become elites, a key term in understanding dynasty in local government practices.⁴

In practice, the actualization of political dynasties is carried out from several perspectives, namely neopatrimonialism,

¹ Haryanto, "Elit Politik Lokal dalam Perubahan Sistem Politik". JSP Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, 2009. hlm. 63

² Djafar, M. "Demokratisasi, DPRD, dan Penguatan Politik Lokal". Jurnal Poelitik, 2008. Hlm. 4

³ Marijan, K. Sistem Politik Indonesia: Konsolidasi Demokrasi Pasca-Orde Baru. Jakarta: Kencana, 2010. Hlm. 164

⁴ Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Perang Bintang: Konstelasi Dan Prediksi Pemilu Dan Pilpres, Jakarta: Mizan Publika, 2014. Hlm. 30.

political clans, and political predators. Dynastic politics is a series of human political strategies aimed at maintaining power by bequeathing existing power to others who are related to the previous power holder.

There are also positive and negative interpretations of dynastic politics. These negative and positive aspects depend on the process and outcomes (outputs) of the positions of power held by the political network in question. If the election process is pure and democratic, and the leadership brings positive development and public welfare, dynastic politics can have a positive connotation. However, if the opposite occurs, it can have negative connotations.

Furthermore, the positive and negative meanings of dynastic politics are also determined by the realities of society's social conditions, legal systems, law enforcement, and the political institutions in question. Dynastic politics, which occurs in societies with low levels of political education, weak legal systems and law enforcement, and unstable political institutions, can have negative connotations.⁵

In this modern era, dynastic politics has been considered outdated, especially in Indonesia, which adheres to a democratic system. It should be abandoned, as the principles of democracy are "of the people, by the people, and for the people." Power rests with the people, and the people hold control through their right to vote. The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia affirms that supreme sovereignty rests with the people. Therefore, dynasties are the opposite of democracy. However, in this democratic era, dynasties still exist, despite the existence of political parties and direct elections. Today, dynasties are governed through political parties, hence the term "dynastic politics".

Another topic of discussion regarding dynastic politics is nepotism. Political officials in this country are practicing the habits of previous kings. This is evident in how rulers,

both at the central and regional levels, compete to appoint relatives, friends, and close associates to positions within their jurisdiction. If this is the case, what is the difference between democracy and oligarchy, both of which are held by certain elites.⁶

The presence of political dynasties surrounding power struggles at the regional and national levels makes it difficult to realize the essence of democracy itself. The proliferation of political dynasties, particularly in the regions, is inseparable from the role of political parties and regulations regarding regional elections. Oligarchy within political parties causes the candidacy and nomination mechanisms to function improperly. Throughout this period, there has been a tendency for political parties to nominate candidates based on the wishes of party elites, rather than through democratic mechanisms that consider the candidates' abilities and integrity. Simultaneously, political dynasties continue to build strong networks of power to maintain their hold on power within the party, both at the regional and national levels. Therefore, it is certain that political dynasties are capable of dominating and stifling democracy within political parties.

Within the community itself, there are also indications of efforts to maintain the status quo in their regions by encouraging family members or close associates of regional heads to replace incumbents. These ruling families will eventually evolve into regional political dynasties that will be difficult to defeat in every regional head election. Thus, their existing power will be eternal.⁷ Dynasties also become a way to create new kingdoms within their circles of power or structure them only to position family, children, and colleagues.⁸ One example of dynastic politics is through regional elections, which provide a broad space for citizens to choose and even run for regional head or deputy head. Therefore, the election of regional heads and deputy regional heads, which are directly elected by the Regional

⁵Democracy Maddick, Desentralisation, and Development, Bandung: Bombay-Asian Publishing House, 2005.145

⁶Hollyson Rahmat, Pilkada: Penuh Euforia, Miskin Makna, Jakarta: Penerbit Lestari, 2015. hlm. 150

⁷Ways A Muliansyah, Political: Ilmu Politik, Demokrasi, Partai Politik Dan Welfare State, Yogyakarta: Buku Litera, 2015. 108

⁸Ni'matul Huda, Perkembangan Hukum Tata Negara Perdebatan dan Gagasan Penyempurnaan, Yogyakarta: FH UII Press, 2014. hlm. 405

People's Representative Council (DPRD), has drawn numerous criticisms, believing that the election is the result of political lobbying, even though the results will be brought to the central government, and the central government will determine the final outcome for regional head. Therefore, the choice by representative institutions is not the direct will of the people, nor is it the sovereignty of the people embodied in the general will, namely the shared will in accordance with the public interest. As Jean Jacques Rousseau said, it assumes that the sovereignty of the people is absolute, eternal, complete and original, originating from the people themselves so that it cannot be represented.⁹

Regional autonomy has slightly reduced the central government's role in determining the positions of regional head and deputy regional head. Regional elections emerged from corrections to the implementation of regional head elections by the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) as stipulated in Article 18 of Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government. Regents and Mayors are elected independently by the Regency/City DPRD without involving the provincial or central government. Therefore, Regents/Mayors are accountable to and can be dismissed by the DPRD before the end of their term. Meanwhile, the central government (President) is only given the power to "temporarily dismiss" a Regent/Mayor if they are deemed to endanger national integrity.¹⁰

Looking at the track record of political dynasties in the Indonesian state, they have actually existed and occurred since the time of the kingdoms. The king held absolute power. The kingdom was based on a dynastic structure, where the king's descendants were recognized as successors to the throne if the king died, died in war, or was no longer able to serve as king. The king's role was significant, but the people lacked full power and could do nothing but

submit to their king. It's interesting to read Robert Filmer's thesis, refuted by John Locke, which stated that God gave power to the king, not the citizens.¹¹

The political dynasties that emerged in Indonesia after independence are not significantly different from those of the colonial era or the traditional kingdom era. In fact, traditional leadership styles in the modern era are legitimized by the democratic system. For example, the leadership of Queen Atut in Banten. The term political dynasty is not unique to Indonesia; it is also recognized worldwide. For example, political dynasties have also flourished in the United States, with the Kennedy and Bush dynasties; the Aquino, Arroyo, and Conjuangco families in the Philippines; the Gandhi family in India; and in Indonesia, Sukarno and Suharto also practiced this traditional leadership style.

Several examples of political dynasties in Indonesia, often implicated in corruption scandals, indicate that political dynasties present several problems. Of course, not all political dynasties end badly. The shift in regional head elections, from elections conducted through the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) to direct elections by the people, should empower citizens to exercise their political rights more intelligently. Power should be directed toward bringing change to society, rather than furthering the economic and political power of their families.¹² Experiences in countries like India, the Philippines, and the United States, with more advanced and developed democratic systems, can provide direct transmission of experiences and lessons to family members.¹³

The phenomenon of political dynasties has drawn mixed reactions from various groups. On the one hand, the existence of political dynasties is a consequence of democracy, which grants citizens the freedom to exercise their political rights. This means that in a democracy, there are no political dynasties,

⁹ Ni'matul Huda, *Pengawasan Pusat Terhadap Daerah Dalam Penyelenggaraan Pemerintah Daerah*, Yogyakarta: UII Press, 2007. Hlm. 72

¹⁰ Theodrik Simorangkir (ed.), *Pemilihan Kepala Daerah*, Jakarta: Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional Kementerian Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia RI, 2011. Hlm. 19

¹¹ Ni'matul Huda., *Perkembangan...*, Op. Cit. hlm. 418

¹² Roger Scruton, *The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought*, 3rd Edition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Hlm. 122

¹³ Ernesto Dal Bo and Dal Bo, Pedro and Snyder, Jason, 2009, *Political Dynasties.....*hlm. 65

as the choice is returned to the people. However, on the other hand, if there are no restrictions on political rights, which are controlled only by families, it will actually threaten democracy. This is where the problem lies. The political excitement in Indonesia during the current reform era, which allows everyone to participate in the practical political arena, has created a frenzied political battle. The battle for support is most clearly visible in the many actions taken, including the emergence of dynastic politics, where many candidates emerge from within one's own family.

METHOD

This research uses a normative legal research method or library research¹⁴, which focuses on the study of laws and regulations, doctrines, and court decisions related to dynastic politics in regional head elections in Indonesia. The approaches used include: 1. A legislative approach, to examine the legal norms governing regional head elections. 2. A conceptual approach, to understand the concept of dynastic politics and the principles of democracy. 3. A case approach, by examining relevant Constitutional Court decisions.

The legal sources consist of primary legal materials (the 1945 Constitution, the Regional Election Law, Constitutional Court decisions), secondary legal materials (books, journals, scientific articles), and tertiary legal materials (dictionaries, legal encyclopedias). Data collection was conducted through literature studies, while analysis was conducted descriptively and qualitatively by interpreting and comparing legal materials to find the compatibility between legal regulations and democratic principles in the context of dynastic politics in Indonesia.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1. Background to the Emergence of Political Dynasties in Regional Head Elections in Kediri Regency

According to Scruton, a dynasty is a class of sovereigns or rulers, whose succession is determined by blood relationship. Simply

put, a political dynasty can be defined as a political regime or political actor that exercises government power through generations, based on family or kinship ties. This political regime is formed due to a very high level of concern for politics among family members, and the orientation of this political dynasty is usually to gain power and maintain it for as long as possible.

In Indonesia, political dynasties are actually something that is rarely discussed, in practice, political dynasties, whether consciously or not, have existed since the era of independence. Political dynasties are a pattern that persists in modern Western societies, as well as in societies that imitate Western styles. This can be seen in American politics, as well as in the Philippines and several other Asian countries. A study of dynastic politics by Ernesto Dal Bo, Pedro Dal Bo, and Jason Snyder on political dynasties in the United States Congress since its founding in 1789 provides several insights. First, there is a correlation between political dynasties and political competition.

The rise of dynastic politics is directly proportional to unhealthy political competition. The more unfair the rules of the game in political contests, the more dynastic politics thrives. Second, the longer a person serves in Congress, the more likely they are to encourage their family members to join the body. Power, which tends to produce power within itself, is what they call "power begets power".

The political dynasty agenda is practiced by adapting to all sorts of modern democratic procedures. This seemingly excludes opportunities for regeneration and cadre formation. Efforts to establish a political dynasty are carried out in accordance with democratic mechanisms and procedures, even though they are fundamentally at odds with the substance of democracy. Therefore, the phenomenon of political dynasties mentioned above can be said to be procedurally irrelevant wrong. However, upon closer examination, there are clearly very serious issues concerning the failure of political parties to develop cadres and recruit regional head candidates. This is

¹⁴ Wijaya, Sandy. "Reinterpretation of the Kafa'Ah Concept in Jasser Auda's Perspective." *Nurani: Jurnal Kajian Syari'ah*

Dan Masyarakat 21, no. 2 (2021): 307–16. <https://doi.org/10.19109/nurani.v21i2.10221>.

evident in the dominant involvement of a number of incumbents in regional elections. Democracy—through direct elections and decentralization in autonomous regions—is intended to divide power and prevent government power from being concentrated in the hands of one person, one family, or one dynasty. But what is the reality? Incumbent regional heads seem to be taking advantage of the situation and vying to maintain power.

The essence of the limitation clause that a person may only hold the position of regional head for a maximum of two consecutive terms according to Law Number 23 of 2014 is to prevent the occurrence of regional heads for life or holding government power for too long. Power that is in one hand for too long tends to lead to the practice of abuse of power, which usually takes the form of an authoritarian and/or corrupt regime. The strong influence of incumbents in regional government, especially incumbents who have been in power for ten years (two terms), means that regional government officials must inevitably provide support to them so that their careers, economic and social resources are not disturbed.

Whether they realize it or not, during their two terms in office, a regional head has undoubtedly been able to build a bureaucratic culture characterized by a patrimonial character. This bureaucratic culture subsequently gives rise to patron-client relationships, both between the regional head and his subordinate staff, as well as between the regional head and the business, social, and political elites within their jurisdiction. By leveraging their strength, authority, and access to substantial funds to influence and mobilize the people, through appeals for participation and mobilization, it is not surprising that incumbents are able to maintain their power in various regional elections. And with this influence, incumbent regional heads are able to win in various elections.

Political dynasties in Indonesia are rarely discussed or debated, yet in practice, they have been, consciously or unconsciously, a determinant of Indonesian politics since the era of independence. Political dynasties are a pattern found in both modern Western societies and those that imitate Western styles.

Political dynasties in Indonesia have actually emerged within the family of

Indonesia's first President, President Soekarno. This is evident from the birth of Soekarno's children who continued their father's work as politicians. Such as Megawati Soekarno Putri (who recently also increasingly shows symptoms of Indonesian political dynasty in her daughter - Puan Maharani), Guruh Soekarno Putra, and others. In the contemporary setting, political dynasties are also now seen emerging within the family of former Indonesian President KH Abdurrahman Wahid, with the emergence of his siblings and also his biological children into the world of Indonesian politics. The tendency of political dynasties is also shown in the family of current Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, as demonstrated by the role of his son Eddie Baskoro who succeeded in becoming a member of the House of Representatives for the 2009/2014 period.

This has occurred in several regencies/cities across Indonesia. In Asahan Regency, for example, Regent Drs. H. Risuddin is now supporting his own wife, Hj. Helmiati, to succeed him as regent. Similarly, in Labuhan Batu Regency, Regent HT Milwan has long been preparing his wife, Hj. T. Adlina, to compete in the regional elections. Meanwhile, in Tebing Tinggi City, Mayor Abdul Hafiz Hasibuan is working extra hard to appoint his younger brother, Umar Zunaidi Hasibuan, as his successor.

The Political Dynasty in Kediri began in 1999 and is still led by one family. The dynasty phenomenon in Kediri is a type of Regeneration Political Dynasty, the model is like a family gathering. The characteristic of this dynasty is uninterrupted leadership, namely one family leading one region without interruption. In 1999, at the beginning of the post-reform era and the election, it was still not directly elected by the people but was elected by members of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) at that time. Many previous regents were from high-ranking military officers and finally after the post-reform era, new leaders were appointed based on deliberations by members of the regional legislature or what we usually call the DPRD. Initially, several DPRD members did not have a candidate name to be inaugurated as regent because at that time there was still no figure

capable of leading a region other than the military.

After several deliberations, Ir. Sutrisno, with a background as a PPL in the agricultural sector, emerged. Beyond his background, Sutrisno's performance was also excellent, as he possessed a strong fighting spirit to advance and develop village agriculture. After deliberations by the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), Ir. Sutrisno was finally elected as Regent.

2004 was the year when the Regional Head was directly elected by the people through the General Election. In that year, the incumbent Regent Sutrisno was running for re-election. He felt that he was capable of bringing and leading Kediri Regency towards change and development in various sectors such as the economy, infrastructure, education, and others. And some people at that time also felt that Mr. Sutrisno was capable of bringing Kediri to change. That was the beginning of Sutrisno's power in two terms.

Furthermore, in 2009, Ir. Sutrisno's term as Regent of Kediri ended and it turned out that Sutrisno's power did not stop for two periods. The advancement of the two wives of the Regent of Kediri, who were known as the mistresses of one another, in the 2009-2014 Kediri Regency Pilkada was truly interesting to observe. How could it not be, with the reason that the husband could not run again as Regent of Kediri due to the requirements (he had already served two terms as Regent), so he nominated his two wives at once as Regent candidates. Inevitably, many parties suspected that the reason for their nomination was because they were "afraid" that the Regent of Kediri would fall to someone else or because of competition between the two mistresses, so that competition between the two wives occurred.

After a long silence, the issue of dynastic politics resurfaced in 2015. This was not without reason, as Kediri Regency participated in simultaneous regional elections on December 9th. Haryanti again ran for regent in that election. This time, Haryanti's modus operandi was to continue her unfinished work programs. Many media outlets accused Haryanti's extended family of forming dynastic politics in Kediri Regency.

2. Dynastic Politics in Regional Head Elections Could Develop

Dynasty politics in regional head elections can develop due to the following factors:

a. Figures and Characters

The existence of the Sutrisno Dynasty at the peak of power in Kediri survived because of its ability to use a patronage network that was convected through clientelism as political support that continued to develop and did not change throughout the ages and was sustainable and the leadership that was implemented in implementing leadership methods that were implemented through an approach with non-formal methods that were not official by using personal wisdom without looking at the background of the community.

In politics, power is necessary to support and ensure the implementation of political decisions in society. Wisdom in family politics serves as a kind of mantra that can transform formal relationships into personal ones. However, when it comes to real politics, political dynasties can survive because those within the dynasty's circle possess considerable abilities and resources.

While others can't match it, several factors contribute to the survival of a dynasty, including political party consolidation, project consolidation, political consolidation, and the consolidation of key organizations considered close to the people.

The long history of the initial figure and character of a prospective regional head before taking office at that time became very important before becoming the chairman of the PDIP DPC until now, in the post-reform era at that time many elite officials saw that apart from Sutrisno having a good work ethic and based on enthusiasm when he used to work, he had a high work ethic and was wise in every decision making making him one of the most important figures at that time as well as many relations with village government officials and various community leaders and religious leaders in Kediri district.

Therefore, several community leaders and elites agreed to recommend people who have the figure and character to become regents or post-reform elections for regional heads or regents are still chosen or appointed by the Regency DPRD. Previously, there were also several candidates nominated by several faction members, but during the deliberation, Sutrisno was finally elected as Regent at that time and after that in 2004 the first direct election was held, Sutrisno nominated again as Regent or Incumbent, he felt that the work program he implemented still had to be continued or continued and he felt he was still capable of leading Kediri Regency. After defeating several other candidates.

b. Decentralization of Power

Discussions about regional governance are inextricably linked to decentralization. Generally speaking, decentralization is the transfer of governmental affairs from the central government to autonomous regions based on the principle of autonomy. This definition aligns with Law No. 23 of 2014. With decentralization, autonomy emerges for a region. Therefore, along with decentralization, democratization in the regions becomes a process of revitalizing the power of local or traditional elites to rule. Local elites seek to reassert their influence as key players.

Authority that previously resided solely with the central government has now shifted to the regions. Regional heads can emerge from below (the community). Initially, they emerged from below and were certified (elected) from below. But now, they are drawn from above (local elites). (Regional heads) emerge from below, from the sidelines, perhaps from above, and are certified from above.

A decentralized government is essentially a semi-dependent organization. This means it has (limited) freedom to act without central approval, but its status cannot be compared to that of a sovereign

state. The problem is not simple when decentralized government units must limit their authority and regulate their institutional relationships with one another. Every country inevitably experiences tension and even conflict between units or levels of government as a result of inappropriate institutional arrangements.

c. Transactional Politics

The next factor is the occurrence of transactional politics between Sutrisno and several elites in the village or region. While working as a PPL, he also established relationships and carried out communication to many parties, especially those in power in villages in the Kediri district. He established cooperation in the form of transactional politics with village government officials, one of which was infrastructure development in the village, the impact was sympathy and support from the community to be directed at a figure of DN, a figure who had been left behind and finally could develop. This is because the incumbent's power is used to increase the political power of relatives, for example by using public resources for personal enrichment or to fund parties and clientelistic practices that are important supporters of successful elections in many developing countries. With vital sectors that have been held by family members, power and authority will be easier to exercise. There is clear evidence that incumbency will provide a greater opportunity for family members to occupy a certain position compared to political candidates without kin connections in the political system. On the one hand, political candidates gain advantages in gaining votes by exploiting incumbency in the political system, on the other hand, it will create political dynasties that are prone to abuse of political ethics.

The Sutrisno dynasty views the distribution of patron resources as an obligation to share with other local residents through the spaces provided by the local social and economic structure.

This means that the distribution of patron resources is a form of social sensitivity of a political dynasty to its environment without being accompanied by political motives. Like those who have received good services, assistance, and jobs or positions, clients strive to repay these kindnesses by remaining loyal within the client network. They seek to identify themselves as loyal clients to their patrons by providing support and mobilizing votes in regional head elections and other elections.

The people of Kediri seem to have been conditioned by Sutrisno's attitude and policies as the highest power holder. When his wife served two terms as regent, Mr. Sutrisno was also given a very important position in the Kediri district government, namely as Chairman of the TPPD, this is what he really took advantage of by carrying out political cartelization in the form of regional leadership forum, many relations of officials or people who work under him serve loyally in order to get rewards in the form of positions or strategic projects in government development with the aim that all government affairs and power that have been built continue to run according to Sutrisno's plan, finally many parties are competing to approach and are ready to help Mr. Sutrisno and Mrs. Haryanti, both from old people and new people.

This mutually beneficial patron-client relationship is what sustains power in a region. This is a form of political approach that involves the community in its economic projects. Furthermore, the support of village funds from the central government also ensures that all of Sutrisno's policies, formulated through his wife, can be implemented effectively. By being behind the scenes, Sutrisno can more freely manage the relationships between family members who hold regional positions and legislative officials, maintaining a solid and consistent political dynasty.

d. Capitalist-Bureaucratic Relations

There are many reasons to conclude that dynastic politics and political dynasties can thrive in Indonesia, whether viewed from a cultural, cognitive-emotional, or socio-economic perspective. The tendency toward cult-like figures surrounded by myths, the still-visible traces of feudalism, the still-inegalitarian social structure and interactions, and the economic and educational disparities among citizens could all be contributing factors.

First and foremost, when discussing the development of political dynasties in the regions, it's crucial to consider the power networks formed in both formal and informal spheres, which typically occur within political-economic contexts. This is done by regional heads before they begin to position their relatives as part of the political dynasty project. These power networks are built on the synergy of bureaucracy, capitalism, and politicians, forming formal and informal power networks within local communities. The narrative of the politicization of functions and the mobilization of bureaucrats as key vote-getters in regional elections is not a new practice, having been widely practiced at various city and district levels.

Politicians are usually used to secure the candidacy of relatives who wish to run for regional elections or other strategic positions in the region.

e. Familialism or Family Factors

The populist-based familial political dynasty highlighted in government succession is an effort to "secure" the previous regional head's program. This is related to the reproduction of the heroism and populism discourse of the previous administration's program, which is used as campaign material by relatives to replace their other relatives. Although his wife has become a formal regent, the husband still plays a significant role in the informal regent position, providing specific input to her. This means that the influence of masculinist family power remains entrenched in the government, even though

the wife's position as regent is higher than that of her husband, who has returned to being a commoner.

This situation also changed the paradigm of the household, which initially consisted of a single house, to a regional one. It is at this level that "gono-gini power" applies. The wife is in the formal domestic sphere, while the husband is in the informal social arena. Ultimately, this political dynasty model takes the form of a puppet government, as the husband holds the true power, while the wife merely serves as a symbol of government. Voter preferences in these three regions in electing regional heads are still overshadowed by the populism of the previous regional head, so the chosen regional head candidate is usually one who is close to the figure or has direct ties to the regional head. It is even unlikely that the husband, upon release from his imprisonment, would again be favored as regent to replace his wife. In this political dynasty model, the scent of oligarchy is felt, but not strongly, because what is actually being built is romanticism and populism mixed with oligarchy. Therefore, calling it a form of local mafia, in Sidel's term, seems inappropriate in describing this context.

The people who are actually the main actors in the local democratization process in their regions actually maintain the status quo of this oligarchic leadership as a form of loyalty and affinity for the redistribution of populist programs implemented through the 'pork barrel' political scheme. For this reason, the author prefers to call the political dynasty in these three cases as populism oligarchy or populism dynastie, because the logic of oligarchy is built on the popularity of candidates supported by populist programs through budget politicization.

For almost 15 years running a political dynasty, Sutrisno and his family have controlled several important assets in the Kediri regency area. Not only Sutrisno, several of his family members also hold

strategic positions in both the executive and legislative branches. This is also a supporting factor for Sutrisno in developing his power in the form of a political dynasty. In addition, the disorganized civil society factor makes the government very minimally attacked by several negative issues and political opponents, this can happen because it has successfully conditioned the Kediri community and the very inclusive nature of the political dynasty itself.

A political party is an organization that functions to channel the aspirations of the people. However, in the election of the party chairman or other officials, the people do not elect them, but rather the party members themselves. For example, Mr. Sutrisno, as the chairman of the DPC, immediately appointed his wife to be a candidate for regent from the PDIP party, even though Haryanti herself is not a cadre or member of the party. He also argued that only Mrs. Haryanti inherited political skills from Mr. Sutrisno himself. Of course, some people considered this to be against political ethics, but some party members stated that it was not because the election was conducted within their party.

While we should remember that political parties are a vehicle for public aspirations in politics, the lack of highly electable figures or political opponents is also a contributing factor to the growth of this dynasty. Sutrisno, within the PDIP itself, has indirectly weakened the party's function, seeking new, ideal leaders from within the party. This is what has caused the Kediri community to experience a decline in voter participation, which has only reached around 60% in recent years.

Political dynasties are indeed a product of modern democracy. However, the success of forming a political dynasty itself is left to the market, namely voters in elections.

f. Patron and Client Relationship

In general, the formal power base of local political dynasties in Indonesia is built

on paternalistic relationships through the redistribution of populist programs generated through "pork barrel" politics and the politicization of the budget cycle. This then fosters close and romantic relationships between leaders and their people, making it easy for leaders to shape persuasive policies through the disbursement of money to remote areas.

In relation to leadership succession, the politicization of bureaucrats and the socialization of informal community figures are part of the intimacy that acts as an intermediary agent in winning and perpetuating the power of political families.

Discussions about political dynasties in the local political sphere are very different from those occurring at the national level. In the local realm, the romanticization of the prestige of familism ensures the continued existence of a political dynasty. Familism itself is formed by three elements: personalism, clientelism, and tribalism, which are three keys to unraveling the underlying basis of the familism trend of power in local democracy in Indonesia.

These three processes play a significant role in local government succession in Indonesia, which occurs in two ways: by design and by accident. Political dynasties, which are by design, have been established for a long time, with strong familial networks within the government itself, such that relatives seeking to enter government or politics are pre-designed to occupy specific positions.

Sutrisno's numerous relatives, from the village to the regional level, are another factor, as is the patron-client relationship. If people who have been given Sutrisno's trust and are able to carry out the tasks or orders given, they will receive rewards, both material and immaterial, in the form of positions or strategic development projects. Approaching the regent election to be held in 2019, one of Sutrisno's family members, Yogi Rahmanto, who is his son-in-law, has recently begun seeking sympathy and votes

from several elements of Kediri society, especially young voters, by holding participatory events. Politicians here act as the Chief Organizer or Implementer, this is a form of political marketing with the aim of getting the public to recognize the figure of a politician or a figure who is very close to the residents. Kinship or family connections in the political realm are very profitable for candidates, where candidates can use the big name of families with high positions in the political system to gain votes.

g. Shadow State Practices in Regional Government Administration

In the executive branch, there is one key actor who played a crucial role in the constellation during Haryanti's leadership: her husband, Ir. Sutrisno, who was also the former regent of Kediri for two terms. Furthermore, there is also an important actor in the legislative branch: a relative of the figure. Although these two actors have different political interests and resources, their relationship is quite solid in local government.

There are at least several reasons why these two actors have been able to build a relatively solid power relationship. The first factor is the bond of bureaucratic colleagues. Both actors, long-standing members of regional politics, consistently held strategic positions during their tenure.

This relationship has fostered trust between the former regent and the chairman of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). Several findings from sources I've gathered indicate that the figurehead, as a regional head candidate, intervened with officials and bureaucrats to ensure they were willing to carry out his orders. Furthermore, during meetings or working visits, the figurehead's presence was always closely associated with influential figures who were related. In some activities, Sutrisno was also appointed to lead working meetings, while Hayanti, as the regent with the legitimacy

to lead meetings and briefings, remained largely silent. Several policies and regulations created and issued by the district government were closely linked to the figurehead's interference. It can be concluded that Haryanti was merely a puppet, while Sutrisno was the puppeteer. He was tasked with ordering, mobilizing, and directing his wife in all her political rights to comply with his orders. While the figurehead was clearly only a former regent with no legitimacy in government, the facts on the ground contradicted this.

CONCLUSION

Dynasty Politics in Regional Head Elections in Indonesia is a bad precedent of democracy that has been going on in Indonesia so far, besides having a negative impact from the Political, Economic and Legal side, Furthermore, this Dynasty Politics can develop because of the very strong Patron-Client relationship that supports this dynasty will continue forever, and of course it is very difficult to break the chain of this relationship because it has been going on for more than a dozen years. The regeneration of the relationship between Patron and Client is also still very strong, their relationship from father to son and even to their grandchildren in the future is also a supporting factor.

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