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Local Regimes and their Effects on Democracy: Analysis of Typology of Political Dynasty of Ratu Atut Choisyiah

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Abstrak

Political dynamics in the local arena of Banten Province as a province in Indonesia lead to aspects that are opposite and contrary to the values of democratization. Decentralization that is successfully carried out in an open and participatory manner will prevent corrupt behaviour, and vice versa if local political domination is gripped by people who have veto power, then the implementation of decentralization will be distorted and lead to corrupt actions or abuse of power. Political dynasties as a form of abuse of power, one of which occurred in Banten Province with the long-lasting political dynasty of the Ratu Atut Chosiyah family. Against the background of pluralism in Indonesia, then the typology of local regimes in Indonesia is categorized with a typology that divides local regimes according to the characteristics of the region viewed through the relationship between formal and informal institutions and formal and informal actors. So, what local regime typology is categorized into the Banten regime that tends to build power using family network instruments? This study uses a descriptive qualitative approach to analyse regime patterns in Banten Province and see how the running of government under the control of the regime affects democracy in the local political arena concerning the theory of decentralization, democracy theory, and local regime theory. The conclusion that we get from this research is that the regime of Banten Province is categorized into a formalist elitist typology concerning the Ratu Atut family, which every election always tries to legitimize its power formally. Apart from that, the factors described in the

typology theory of local regimes in the formalist elitist category are also evident in Banten Province which then shows the failure of democratization which should have been created due to decentralization.

Keywords: Local Regime, Political Dynasty, Decentralization, Democratization

Abstrak

Dinamika politik di arena lokal Provinsi Banten sebagai salah satu provinsi di Indonesia berujung pada aspek yang berlawanan dan bertolakbelakang dengan nilai-nilai demokratisasi. Desentralisasi yang berhasil dilaksanakan secara terbuka dan partispatif akan mencegah perilaku koruptif, dan sebaliknya apabila dominasi politik lokal dicekram oleh orang yang memiliki veto power maka implementasi desentralisasi akan terdistorsi dan berujung pada tindakan koruptif atau penyelewengan kekuasaan. Dinasti politik sebagai salah satu wujud penyelewengan kekuasaan salah satunya terjadi di Provinsi Banten dengan langgengnya dinasti politik keluarga Ratu Atut Chosiyah. Dilatarbelakangi oleh pluralisme yang ada di Indonesia, maka tipologi rezim lokal di Indonesia terkategorikan dengan tipologi yang membagi rezim lokal sesuai dengan karakteristik wilayah tersebut yang ditinjau melalui hubungan antara institusi formal dan informal dan aktor formal dan informal. Maka, dikategorikan kepada tipologi rezim lokal apa rezim Banten yang cenderung membangun kekuasaan menggunakan instrumen jaringan keluarga? Penelitian ini menggunakan metode pendekatan kualitatif deskriptif untuk menganalisis pola rezim di Provinsi Banten dan melihat bagaimana jalannya pemerintahan diatas kendali rezim tersebut mempengaruhi demokrasi pada arena politik lokal tersebut dengan mengacu pada teori desentralisasi, teori demokrasi dan teori rezim lokal. Kesimpulan yang kami dapatkan dari penelitian ini adalah rezim Provinsi Banten dikategorikan kepada tipologi formalis elitis dengan merujuk pada keluarga Ratu Atut yang setiap pemilu selalu berupaya untuk melegitimasi kekuasaannya secara formal. Selain itu faktor-faktor yang dijelaskan dalam teori tipologi rezim lokal kategori formalis elitis juga terbukti nyata adanya di Provinsi Banten yang kemudian menunjukan kegagalan demokrastisasi yang seharusnya tercipta karena desentralisasi. Kata Kunci: Rezim Lokal, Dinasti Politik, Desentralisasi, Demokratisasi

INTRODUCTION

Political dynasties have appeared long ago in democratic countries and create concern in society due to inequality in the distribution of political power (Viana, 2019). This is of course an imperfect reflection of democratic political representation (Ritonga & Harahap, 2023). When political positions in government are open to the public, the ruling family will get a position and be awarded an advantage that makes government hereditary (Synder, et al, 2009).

In an efficient and just democracy, the people are key and have a great opportunity in the political process in the country. This means that politics must have open participation for all candidates so that competition in general elections can be accountable. People are hindered by their status and social rights because of the impact of political dynasties. If democracy is found to be powerless in government, political

dynasties certainly trigger political pragmatism. The Nagara Institute states that data regarding political dynasties until 2020 will continue to increase significantly, namely political dynasties in Indonesia have a percentage of 14.78% where 80 Indonesian regions have practiced political dynasties out of 541 existing regions (Taher, 2020). This data is evidence of the rise of Indonesia's political dynasty when the regional elections are over. The phenomenon of political dynasties can be seen in the data that political dynasties have existed for a long time and have even become deviations that continue to increase from year to year.

During the era of President Soeharto, of course, political dynasties were already known. Since the Suharto era, this political dynasty has become an influential and powerful part of the Suharto extended family. The phenomenon of political dynasties then spread since regional autonomy began to be opened for all people until now. Political dynasties have roots in government, especially in regions (Nugroho 2016), it can be seen from its growth and several cases show the year-to-year process of strengthening political dynasties such as in the Ogan Ilir, South Sulawesi, and Banten areas.

Banten area, the political dynasty started from Ratu Atut Chosiyah's father named Chasan Sochib (P2D 2011). Chasan Sochib began to build a successful political dynasty so that with the appointment of Atut as governor of Banten in 2007-2017, they were able to successfully gain positions in political seats. Ratu Atut and Tubagus Chairil Wardana, who as his younger siblings, were found to be corrupt by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2013 in a bribery case against Constitutional Court Judge, Akil Mokhtar. This bribery case occurred due to a dispute over the Regional Head Election (Pilkada) for Lebak Regency, Banten Province, and the procurement of funds for medical equipment which had been corrupted from 2011 to 2013. Ratu Atut and Wawan who were arrested by the KPK, made political observers predict a political dynasty in Banten will go aground and perish.

It turns out that Atut's family can still be successful even though Atut has been imprisoned. the imprisonment of Atut and his younger sibling could not affect his family's victory in the Banten regional elections which were held simultaneously in 2015, namely Airin Rachmi Diany serving in South Tangerang City, Tanto Warsono as son-in-law as well as family being a representative in Pandeglang Regency, and Ratu Tatu Chasanah as his younger sibling who paired with Pandji Tirtayasa in Serang District. The Atut family also won in the 2017 gubernatorial election where Andika Hazrumy was Atut's son. The success achieved by the Atut family in occupying political office certainly proves that observers' predictions of the collapse of the political dynasty, because Ratu Atut has been caught, are not proven.

In this study the authors use three theories which will be explained further in the research method, these three theories are the theory of decentralization which is related to the theory of democracy to become the basis for the view of local democracy in decentralized areas, and the theory of local regimes, which we will relate with the case that occurred in Banten. The previous research that has been conducted on the same topic is contained in the book "Local Regimes in Indonesia: Redefining Our Democracy" written by Longgina Novadona Bayo, Purwo Santoso, and Willy Purna Samadhi. The book has explained in detail the typology of local regimes and various case studies in each type of local regime, based on the research conducted in this book.

The case studies in the book have many areas discussed, in which there is also a

case study regarding the Banten area, but the researcher feels that the material used in the book is too long and drawn too far, therefore the researcher is interested in exploring further. what is the current state of Banten, and where is the position of the typology of the local regime that is currently happening in Banten, therefore we are looking for findings that explain the condition of the local regime in Banten.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research was made using a qualitative descriptive approach that focuses on a certain side of a phenomenon. The purpose of the qualitative approach is to understand the phenomenon of what is experienced by the research subject (Moelong, 2018). Some of the goals of descriptive research include collecting actual information to describe existing phenomena in detail, identifying or examining problems and conditions of practices that apply to phenomena, making comparisons, and determining what someone will do. in dealing with problems and learning from experience to solidify decisions and plans for the future (Rachmat, 2009). This qualitative method examines in more depth which ultimately produces descriptive data and can provide an understanding of matters relating to a research subject. The qualitative descriptive approach used is considered by the purpose of this article, namely to see supporting evidence from the local regime typology that occurred in Banten. This research is worthy and important to consider; (1) Decentralization that is successfully implemented in an open and participatory manner has the potential to prevent corrupt behaviour. This research is important to conduct because it can provide in-depth insight into how local political dynamics in Banten Province influence the implementation of decentralization. By understanding the factors that cause distortions in the implementation of decentralization, this research can provide a basis for designing more effective mechanisms in preventing corrupt practices at the local level. (2) This research is relevant to the context of political dynasties in Banten Province, especially the family dynasty of Ratu Atut Chosiyah. Further understanding of how political dynasties can influence the course of decentralization and democracy would make an important contribution to assessing the health of democracy at the local level. This research can open insight into the political strategies used by political dynasties to maintain power and analyse their impact on democratization mechanisms. (3) This research makes a significant contribution to understanding the typology of local regimes in Indonesia, especially Banten Province. By using a descriptive qualitative approach, this research can provide an in-depth analysis of how the regime in Banten Province tends to build power using family network instruments. Understanding these local regime typologies can help design more targeted interventions and policies to strengthen democracy and reduce the potential for abuse of power.

The author uses data that comes from written sources such as journals, books, articles, or other types of literature that are credible and scientific in completing this journal. The main reference we use is the theory of local regime types. Local regimes are the result of complex complications due to state affairs and we as citizens leave these matters to the state. It is clear that when we think about democracy, we have long been in the hegemony of meanings that not only exaggerate the meaning of the state but are also formalistic. In practice, the community seeks and finds solutions to their problems that are not always accessible by the state administration. These citizens act wholeheartedly, but they do not use the characteristics of citizens. There are several attributes: Congregation, association, association, and so on. It is clear that these public affairs are involved in as far as the segment they can control. These things are managed as a form of community welfare, not

as a government agency. At the same time, there are also local authorities and a system of representative bodies at the local level (Bayo & Samadhi, 2018: 37).

In local regime theory, four quadrant types describe the mechanism of each local regime. If seen from the picture above, there are two main points, namely actors and institutions. Quadrant one is the formalist-elitist regime which refers to formal actors and institutions, where there are setups used by regimes to make actors and institutions appear to prioritize formality when in reality behind that many informal things are happening (Bayo & Samadhi, 2018: 51).

Then in quadrant two, there is a consociational local regime, in contrast to the formalistelitist who packs everything from the formal side, this consociational regime is open in policy making and the realm of play presents groups that have interests because they realize that if the actors only think about themselves in setting a policy then something bad will happen to them, because of that there are divisions that are discussed together so that there is a consociational atmosphere (Bayo & Samadhi, 2018: 52).

Furthermore, in quadrant three there is a Socio-culturalist regime, where actors and institutions are openly carried out informally. In contrast to quadrant one, the socio-culturalist regime prioritizes the customary and cultural atmosphere that exists in the region, both from actors and from policy making which is coloured by the interference of related parties, such as in areas with strong Islamic nuances, where politics actors are always close to local religious figures and their strong Islamic policies (Bayo & Samadhi, 2018).

Then finally in the fourth quadrant, there is the Plural-compromising regime, Indonesia is so plural, therefore there must be a way to deal with diversity, but not all regions are capable of it, because of this the plural-compromising regime is marked by actors who are plural but forced into space. formal institutions that are not conducive, so the decisions that apply are pragmatic (Bayo & Samadhi, 2018).

From this theory the researcher began to look for materials regarding the condition of Banten, from these findings, the researcher finally found evidence that fits one of the four types, namely the formalist-elitist local regime type. Finally, this evidence is included in the discussion, the author hopes that after completing this research, this journal can be used as a good reference for academics with the same background as the author or as a medium to increase knowledge about the phenomenon of female candidates in electoral political contestation at the local level.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The Relationship Between Political Dynasties in Banten and the Quality of Local Democracy

Decentralization can be said to be the biological child of democracy. However, decentralization is often a source of conflict of interest between the central and regional governments. This is due to reduced dependence on local government and the authority of the central government. On the one hand, decentralization can provide local governments with flexibility in managing their regions, the distance between the government and the community is getting closer, and political participation in each region is more easily accessible, this can support the increase in the quality of democracy and create good government increasingly lose its power, and it is not uncommon for

local governments to disobey central orders in making policies.

According to Bayo & Samadhi (2018) there are 6 causes for the formation of local regimes at the regional level, namely patterns of power relations at the local level, relations between authorities, the state, and civil society, the influence of informal institutions in local democracy, the existence and influence of from demos, the influence of civil society movements, and how natural resources are managed and distributed in the regions. Local regimes can also be said to be the era of government or a set of mutually agreed rules in the area.

During the New Order era in Indonesia, where the government tended to be centralized, it was only Soeharto who could be said to be a regime, but during the 1998 reform and the decentralization policy in 2001, the regime was not only at the central but local level. Not only that, political dynasties that are synonymous with the Soeharto government and the central government are now also taking place at the local level. The emergence of this local elite is also known as the reorganization of power or the return of the influence of local elite power in democracy (Effendi, 2018). For example, the political dynasty that occurred in Banten Province, where there were 9 family members of Ratu Atut Choisyah (Governor of Banten 2007–2012), held important positions in the Banten government. Apart from himself as a Banten leader, Atut's husband is a member of the DPR, his son is a member of the DPD, Atut's son-in-law is a member of the Serang DPRD, Atut's younger brother is a member of the Banten DPRD, his half-brother is the deputy mayor of Serang, his stepmother is a member of the Serang City DPRD, as well as his brother-in-law who became the Mayor of South Tangerang (Effendi, 2018).

Decentralization according to Grindle (1980) could produce more responsive decision-making, essentially the quality of public services will be better. But unfortunately, what happened in the Government of Banten is different, where public services are controlled by relatives, and of course when making policies it will also be based on the interests of his family (Tulchin, 2012). This shows that decentralization does not only increase the quality of democracy in a country. On the contrary, the decentralization of elites at the local level can create leadership stagnation where access to power is only controlled by certain people, corrupt practices are easier to do because almost all family members look after these practices, the occurrence of clientelistic capitalism is part of cronyism.

The occurrence of this political dynasty in Banten shows that the roots of feudalism and monarchical traditions in Indonesia are still very strong. A country can be said to be a democracy if the country fulfilled two things, namely elections and public participation. Although political dynasties do not violate the rules of democracy in terms of elections, political dynasties cause a loss of social mobilization, because power is only obtained in certain groups of people or elites. The political dynasty of Banten province shows that decentralization reduces the quality of democracy itself. The existence of this phenomenon can also open our eyes to the need to increase political participation as a society.

Candidates for government officials who come from political dynasties should be assessed by the people they lead. This is related to their performance as government officials. It is appropriate for the community to have its evaluation criteria to create fair and corruption-free leaders amid a democratic government system, especially for Banten


residents who have been under the Atut family dynasty for years.

Shifting to the urgency of implementing a decentralization system, the system is used as a bridge to provide better public services accompanied by a more democratic government. However, we can see that the implementation of decentralization, especially in Banten Province, is like a double-edged sword with the existence of a local political dynasty. Autonomous decentralization itself in its implementation must prioritize people's aspirations and efficient public services to realize the welfare of the whole community. Reflecting on the corruption case of Ratu Atut which involved several of her relatives in the government, it seems that the Banten provincial government is still half-hearted in carrying out the decentralization system.

Ratu Atut's corruption case can also be said to be a systematic crime as Oman Abdurahman has always said is the spokesperson for transparency for the people of Banten. It is known that the Atut Dynasty network has spread in many places both at the legislative and executive levels consisting of fellow family members or fellow business partners. Of course, this relatively broad relationship cannot be separated from the role of his younger brother, namely Tubagus Chaeri Wardhana, or what we usually known as Wawan. As the younger brother of Ratu Atut, Wawan has been successful in building relationships with other fellow businessmen to cover up the corruption scandals he is involved in. Therefore, it makes sense that at any time he can silence the media with his financial power. Until its peak, several names such as Tubagus Chaeri Wardhana, Ratu Irma Suryani, Lilis Karyawati, Jon Chaidir, and Ratu Atut themselves were successfully named as suspects after the revelation of the corruption scandal which had so far been rooted in Banten province. It seems that decentralization is only being used as a tool by the local regime to perpetuate its power and turn it into a nest of nepotism, collusion, and corruption. If conditions like this continue, do not expect the decentralization system to be a way out for people's welfare. On this basis, awareness is needed, especially from the community or central and regional government. Do not let the existing decentralization system only be used as political engineering to hide certain interests along with other dirty practices.

Banten From the Perspective of the Formalist-Elitist Local Regime

Local regimes are the result of complex complications due to state affairs and we as citizens leave these matters to the state. It is clear that the democracy, we have long been in the hegemony of meanings that not only exaggerate the meaning of the state, but are also formalistic. In practice, the community seeks and finds solutions to their problems that are not always accessible by state administration. These citizens act wholeheartedly, but they do not use the characteristics of citizens. There are several attributes: Congregation, association, association and so on. It is clear that these public affairs are involved in as far as the segment they can control. These things are managed as a form of community welfare, not as a government agency. At the same time, In local regime theory, there are four quadrant types that describe the mechanism of each local regime. If seen from the picture above, there are two main points, namely actors and institutions. Quadrant one is the formalist-elitist regime which refers to formal actors and institutions, where there are setups used by regimes to make actors and institutions appear to prioritize formality when in reality behind that many informal things are happening (Bayo & Samadhi, 2018).



Source: Bayo & Samadhi, 2018

Then in quadrant two there is a consociational local regime, in contrast to the formalist-elitist who packs everything from the formal side, this consociational regime is open in policy making and the realm of play presents groups that have interests because they realize that if the actors only think about themselves themselves in setting a policy then something bad will happen to them, because of that there are divisions that are discussed together so that there is a consociational atmosphere (Bayo & Samadhi, 2018). Furthermore, in quadrant three there is a Socio-culturalist regime, where actors and institutions are openly carried out informally. In contrast to quadrant one, the socio-culturalist regime prioritizes the customary and cultural atmosphere that exists in the region, both from actors and from policy making which is colored by the interference of related parties, such as in areas with strong Islamic nuances, where political actors are always close to local religious figures and their strong Islamic policies (Bayo & Samadhi, 2018).

Grouping a local regime based on the character of the local regime. Because in the local regime, there will be various kinds of actors who are involved and intersect with the value system and culture of the area. Various actors will carry out their respective roles and give birth to a pattern of relations with a certain style. Previously explained about the political dynasty of Banten which is included in one of the regime typologies, namely the formalist-elitist regime. The formalist-elitist regime itself belongs to the quadrant I regime typology which emphasizes the dominance of formal actors and formal institutions in it. The background of Banten's political dynasty which has penetrated various formal sectors of government.

Highlighting the various characteristics of formalist-elitist regimes, including the dominance of the elite which is very unequal with the people, including over control of resources, the existence of transactional politics carried out between the elite and the people, and the elite taking advantage of their strategic position to prioritize their interests while these actions are deviations that are detrimental to the state.

The three profiles of the formalist-elitist regime can be described in the political climate in Banten, especially the Ratu Atut dynasty. First, the corruption case in procuring medical equipment for the Public Health Centre (Puskesmas) in South Tangerang City in 2012 is proof that Ratu Atut, who at that time sat as an elite and held a formal position as the Governor of Banten, had control over state resources in the form of the Regional

Budget (APBD). fraud has been carried out by inflating the temporary estimated price (HPS) of medical devices to enrich individuals and their groups.

This budget diversion was carried out by Ratu Atut together with his younger brother Tubagus Chaeri Wardana as the Main Commissioner of PT Bali Pacific Pragama (BPP) who controlled the project to reap maximum profits for the corporation. The following is the distribution of the flow of funds in cases of procuring medical devices that are detrimental to the state, reaching 14,528,805,001. This case also involved several other PTs such as PT Java Medica and PT Mikkindo as well as officials from the Health Service (KPK, 2015).

No	Name	Position	The flow of funds received	
1.	Tubagus Chaeri Werdana	Main Commissioner of PT Bali Pacific Pragama (Atut's Brother)	IDR 7.941.630.033	
2.	Yuni Astuti	Owner of PT Java Medica	IDR 5.063.242.496	
3.	Dadang M. Epid	Head of the Health Service	IDR 1.176.500.000	
4.	Agus Marwan	President Director of PT Mikkindo Adiguna	IDR 206.932.471	
5.	Dadang Prijatna	Operational Manager of PT Bali Pacific Pragama	IDR 103.000.000	
6.	Mamak Jamak Sari	Head of Health Promotion and Health Resources (budget user power)	IDR 37.500.000	

Table 1. Distribution of misappropriation of APBD funds for the procurement ofmedical devices for the South Tangerang City Health Center in 2012.

Source: Compiled by the Authors, 2023

Then the second characteristic of the formalist-elitist regime which later became a reference that the regime that had been controlled by the Atut dynasty was categorized into a typology of formalist-elitist regimes, namely the existence of transactional politics even in the electoral process, ways that used money such as dawn attacks, distribution of rice for the poor until the practice of buying and selling votes is carried out to get votes with the aim of winning the election for the candidate pair Ratu Atut-Moch. Masduki (Masaaki & Hamid, 2008). Besides the three characteristics that become a reference in a regime that can be categorized as a formalist-elitist regime, this regime typology is also characterized by democratization in which the dominant figures from the region try to occupy formal positions to strengthen their position. However, this regime does not mean that informal institutions do not play a role.

In winning elections and collecting votes, informal institutions such as customs and religion are utilized by formal figures as one of instruments in their strategy to win electoral politics. Having a family background which is a champion as well as a businessman, of course, in addition to utilizing financial resources, the Ratu Atut dynasty also used an association of champions to rally its strength.

In Banten, together with 118 pencak silat schools, he coordinates two influential champion associations under the auspices of the RBB (United Banten Volunteers) organization, namely the Association of Martial Artists & Cultural Arts (PPPSBBI) and the Agency for the Development of Large Family Potentials (BPPKB). And for areas that do not use a champion, namely Tangerang City and Tangerang Regency and Tangerang City do not use the power of a champion, Ratu Atut's sister mobilized support from 66 former student activists who came from extra-campus organizations such as PMII, HMI, KNPI, and the Daar El Islamic Boarding School. Qoram used the help of the Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI) survey agency as well as the services of political consultant Denny JA, the Indonesian Survey Circle or LSI (Masaaki & Hamid, 2008). The involvement of informal actors or in this case the champion in providing support for Ratu Atut was written in a letter of support dated 18 September 2001 from PPPSBBI. In this letter, the champion declared his support for Ratu Atut in the election as deputy governor candidate (Hidayat, 2007).

In a formalist elitist regime, dominant actors rely on formal institutions such as Banten's central actors who build political dynasties by occupying strategic positions in Banten to maintain their power under the guise of formal legitimacy to sustain their power.

Name	Position/Period	Relationship with Atut	
Hikmat Tomet	Member of DPR RI 2009-2014	Husband	
Heryani	Deputy Regent of Pandeglang 2011-2016	Stepmother	
Andiara Aprilia Hikmat	Member DPD (2019- 2024)	Tanto's second child/wife	
Tubagus Haerul Jaman	Member DPR (2019- 2024)	Younger step-brother	
Ratu Ria Maryana	DPRD Kota Serang (2019-2024)	Younger step-brother	
Adde Rosi Khoerunnisa	Member DPR (2019- 2014)	Andika's daughter-in- law/wife	
Andika Hazrumy	Deputy Governor of Banten (2017- 2022)	The first child	
Tanto W Arban	Deputy Regent of Pandeglang (2015-2020)	Andira's son-in- law/husband	
Ratu Tatu Chasanah	Regent of Serang (2016-2024)	Younger sibling	
Airin Rahmi Diany	Mayor of South Tangerang (2011- 2021)	Atut's sister's wife/wawan's wife	

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Table 2	Ratu Atut's	tamily and	l relatives w	ho hold gov	vernment positions
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Source: Compiled by the Authors, 2019

When the regime is labelled formalistic-elitist, then its deepest core is the formal

position of government institutions. By riding public office, the elite has almost unlimited freedom and therefore is almost unhindered to hide particular interest. The formal implementation of the open tender for development projects organized by the Provincial Government of Banten during the 2003 fiscal year was evident. But behind the formalities to fulfilled administrative procedures, the decision on the tender winner has been arranged and determined. Decision-making and policy implementation in the Banten region are often characterized by 'collusion' and bargaining of interests between local government executive elites and regional government champions-entrepreneurs (Hidayat, 2007).

Another characteristic that can be found in this dynasty is informal interests which are processed in such a way as to become formal interests, for example, as previously mentioned, namely the arrest of Ratu Atut Chosiyah who was serving as Governor of Banten, who was proven to have abused power by committing corruption on the proposed Health Service budget. Banten Province (Farisa, 2022). The corruption case is only concerned with personal interests and the Banten dynasty in enriching themselves in the name of the authority they have. However, in practice the Banten dynasty put forward a formal democratic system by participating in general elections and regional head elections, this is in line with the characteristics of other formalist-elitist regimes, that is, the democratic system is welcomed by formal actors as an effort to maintain their position in formal state positions. If you look closely, the commitments and promises offered are only the surface during the campaign period. Regarding the campaign, it can be said that the popularity of the Banten dynasty is very strong. Evidenced by the continued existence of these family members in power.

Based on the characteristics of the formality-elitist regime, the regime will use popularity in terms of trusting and winning the hearts of the people so they can get a public office. After being elected to a public position, he will present himself as a representative of the state, which is the term for elitist formalism. If you look carefully at the commitments and promises offered, they only surface during the campaign period. Regarding the campaign, it can be said that the popularity of the Banten dynasty is very strong. Evidenced by the continued existence of these family members in power. Based on the characteristics of the formality-elitist regime, the regime will use popularity in terms of trusting and winning the hearts of the people so they can get a public office. After being elected to a public position, he will present himself as a representative of the state, which is the term for elitist formalism. If you look carefully at the commitments and promises offered, they only surface during the campaign period. Regarding the campaign, it can be said that the popularity of the Banten dynasty is very strong. Evidenced by the continued existence of these family members in power. Based on the characteristics of the formality-elitist regime, the regime will use popularity in terms of trusting and winning the hearts of the people so they can get a public office. After being elected to a public position, he will present himself as a representative of the state, which is the term for elitist formalism. Based on the characteristics of the formality-elitist regime, the regime will use popularity in terms of trusting and winning the hearts of the people so they can get a public office. After being elected to a public position, he will present himself as a representative of the state, which is the term for elitist formalism. Based on the characteristics of the formality-elitist regime, the regime will use popularity in terms of trusting and winning the hearts of the people so they can get a public office. After being elected to a public position, he will present himself as a representative of the state, which is the term for elitist formalism.

There are strong reasons why the Banten political dynasty still has a large mass of people and is still elected to the government, even though there have been cases of corruption. The main factor is the strong political dynastic roots that make it easy for Ratu Atut's family to participate in political contestation, plus the political connections that Ratu Atut has built so far. In addition, the Banten dynasty is also adept at carrying out political strategies in warding off various bad news, for example, when bad news blew regarding the abuse of authority and the political dynasty that attacked Airin, Ratu Atut's sister-in-law who was running for Mayor of South Tangerang 2015 (Sukri, 2020).

This bad news can easily be answered by Airin's winning team by including the South Tangerang City infrastructure that was successfully built during Airin's leadership. Another strategy is a campaign strategy that can captivate people's day by going directly to areas where people live to be able to mingle so that their populist figure increases. An example is Andika Hazrumy, son of Ratu Atut, who in 2017 nominated as Deputy Governor of Banten, established intense communication with factory workers in Banten (Sukri, 2020). This proves that massive and rooted mass support and strong strategies will still attract people's hearts, even though they are descendants of corruptors.

CONCLUSION

Decentralization, which is usually closely related to democracy in its implementation, turns out to experience many deviations. The things that are expected from decentralization in improving real democracy provide quite a large gap between the centre and the regions. The large number of local regimes that control the area has led to pseudo-democracy in the region, from the discussion above we can see that Banten is one of the areas with formalist-elitist local regimes, even though all of Ratu Atut's family who hold important positions are formally elected, but corruption and dynasty politics is still seen in a thick layer of formality.

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